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In this paper we analyse the driving forces of the transition from plan to market in China. A 
two segments and two sectors model is constructed to take into account the particular 
economic situation in China during the transition process: a large agricultural sector and an 
industrial sector; a large centrally planned segment and a market segment. The transition from 
plan to market is described by the increasing share the market segment in the whole economy 
on the one hand and the forced adjustment of the behaviour of the planned segment to the 
market situation on the other. Thus this model provides a well structured way to understand 
the complex phenomenon during the transition process and to analysis the driving forces of 
the transition process.  
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During last 20 years, the Chinese economy has experienced significant changes: the centrally 
planned economy has been reformed step by step into a market economy; the traditional 
agricultural economy is becoming more and more a modern industrial economy. To describe 
the transition process1 and to analyse the impact of the reform policies on the transition 
process are the main concern in this paper. 
 
The paper consists of 4 sections. In the first section, we review the economic reform since 
1978 in China, based on which the theoretical model is constructed. In particular, we will 
discuss those reform policies that promote the transition from plan to market. First we discuss 
in detail the rural reform. Then we review the urban reform with the „two-tiers“-system. At 
the end of this section, we summarise the particularities of the transition process in China in 
four working hypotheses, which compose the main ideas used in the construction of the 
theoretical model in this paper.   
 
Based on the description in section 1, a two-segment-model is constructed, where the 
economy is divided according to the institutional conditions of the activities into a planned 
economic segment and a market economic segment. Because the main interest does not lie in 
modelling the planning behaviour, the planned prices and the allocation of the capital stock in 
the planned segment are treated exogenously. The producers in the market segment are 
assumed to be price-takers and try to maximise their profit. The market mechanism is 
functioning mainly through the flexible prices, the flexible production and the flexible 
allocation of resources, and keeps total demand and total supply in balance. In this sense, the 
model can be viewed as a general equilibrium model, with a planned segment that always 
produces some distortion in the model, and a market segment that tries to correct this 
distortion keeps the whole economy in equilibrium. In this section, we examine the conditions 
for the existence of the temporal equilibrium and the growth path derived from temporal 
equilibriums. The difference in the growth rates due to different institutional conditions in the 
two segments is considered the engine of the transition from plan to market in this paper.  
 
In section 3 we will examine factors, that may influence the transition process. We begin with 
factors, that have impact on the extrinsic transition. To these factors, belong the different 
growth mechanisms in the two segments, the saving behaviour, and the distribution of savings 
for investment in the two segments. Then we will examine the factors, that determine the 
intrinsic transition. Facing the faster growth in the market segment and the shrinking share of 
the planned segment, the police makers in the planned segment try in various ways to adjust 
to the new situation. We will study the impact of different adjustment policies in the planned 
economic segment. We will discuss the most important issues in the economic reform ─ the 
price reform, the financial market reform, and the labour market reform. Following the 
discussion of the reform policies, the importance of correct timing of a policy will be 
                     
1 Chinese transition process followed typically the gradual approach where market activities were introduced 
into the economy, while keeping the planned economic activities functioning.  
Of course, an institutional framework has to be set up for the market activities to function. This institutional 
framework is itself an important issue in the transition from the planned to the market economy. It has become 
the most discussed topic in the literature about the transition. Perkins, for instance, listed 5 conditions for the 
reform to be successful.1Byrd discussed the prerequisites for an effectively functioning market.1 In this 
manuscript we take the existence of the necessary conditions for market activities as given, without discussing 
them. The main concern here is, what will happen, if the market comes into being. 
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considered. Then, we will also examine the welfare gains during the transition process 
among different participants in the economy. At the end of this section, we present a feasible 
transition path and try to resolve the question, whether the planned and market segments can 
exist side by side in the long run.  
 
The section 4 involves some numerical simulations of the model. From the discussion in 
section 4 and section 5, we gain an understanding of the qualitative properties of the transition 
from plan to market in the model. We try to demonstrate these properties in section 6 through 
numerical simulations. We will also show the alternative transition paths due to different 
policies and various economic conditions. Finally, we will simulate the realised development 
and compare the numerical simulation with the empirical observations, in order to give the 
latter a theoretical explanation. 
 
In the last section, the main conclusions of this study will be summarised and commented 




The Economic Reform in China  
 
 
1.1 Rural Reform 
 
The Chinese economic reform began with the agricultural reform, which was officially 
announced in the third Congress of the 11th Plenum of the Communist Party in December 
1978. The reform aimed at the reorganisation of the production structure in the rural area, in 
order to achieve a better performance in the agricultural production. In the 1950s, the Chinese 
agriculture had experienced great success. In 1957 the total agricultural production surpassed 
all previous records. During the late 1960s and the 1970s, great effort was made to improve 
the performance of the collective production2. There were campaigns lasting for decades to 
promote the development of agriculture production all over the country. In spite of this, the 
agriculture production showed a kind of stagnation from the 1960s to the end of the 1970s.  
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This was the very reason that a reform in agriculture was undertaken. Moreover, the Chinese 
leadership had learned from the lessons made during the campaign of „great leap forwards“ in 
the late 50s, that there will be no growth in the whole the economy, if there is no growth in 
                     
2In the campagne known as ´Learn from Dazai´ that was set as a model of collective 
production by Mao zedong, every production team was called to cultivate a kind of standerd 
field called Dazai-field and to adapt the experience of Dazai in the organisation of production.   
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the agriculture3. Due to the impatience of realising „the four modernisation“4 the rural 
reform became a political task of first rank.5 
 
The experience of the early 60s naturally served as a reference for the rural reform. At the 
beginning, the reform was just the come-back of Liu and Deng´s economic consolidation 
policy in the early 1960s, which had successfully led China out of the economic crisis at the 
end of 1950s6.  
The so called „household responsibility system“ and the freeing up of the market for 
agriculture products and sideline products constituted the principle components of the rural 
reform, supported by an increase of planned purchasing prices for agricultural products.  The 
key words for this reform were „incentive“ and „efficiency“.  
 
The „household responsibility system“ transferred the collective production teams, which 
consisted of around 10 to 100 families, into household-based production organisation. The 
households were offered the right to use the farmland for around 10 or 20 years and were 
promised a prolongation. As repayment the household was obligated to sell a certain amount 
of their crop to the state at the planned price. Beyond this, the household could decide on 
production independently and could dispose the rest of the production and the profit freely. 
Within two years, the decollectivization was almost completed. At the end of 1980, the 
government announced that there was no more direct intervention in the production plan of 
the farmers7.  
 
The freeing up of the market for agricultural products and sideline products was carried out 
through the promotion of activities in the existing markets and fairs. Instead of the strict 
control as practised before the reform, various infrastructures were provided for the markets 
and fairs. The markets and fairs in the rural area have always been one of the most important 
opportunities for the farmers to get their money income. They existed already before the rural 
reform, however, they had been tightly controlled by the local government. The control had 
been carried out more through the ideological pressure rather than through a strict price 
                     
3It was written in the Kommunique of the third Congress of the 11th Plenum of Communist 
Party China, „Die rasche Entwicklung der gesamten Wirtschaft und die ununterbrochene 
Hebung des Lebensstandards des ganzen Volks basieren darauf, daß die Landwirtschaft 
energisch wiederhergestellt und beschleunigt entwickelt wird.“ Peking Rundschau 1978,  
Vol. 52 p.13 
4The four modernizations were: modernization of agriculture, modernization of industry, 
modernization of notional defence, and modernization of science and technology. The four 
modernizations had been set as main political target by the communist party of China in the 
middle 1970s.   
5Fan Gang explained the starting of reform in agricultur in a ´least resistence´ approach. See 
Fan Gang (1994), p.99 ff.  
6After the failure of Mao’s „great leap forewords“, Chinese economy fell into a serious crisis. 
In line of the consolidation policy of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaopin markets of agricultural 
products and sideline products were given free and the collective communes were reorganised 
in family-based production. With the consolidation policy the economy recovered very soon. 
But this policy ceased with the beginning of the culture revolution and had been criticised as 
´revisionism´. 
7See Peking Rundschau Vol.50 1980, p.4.  
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administration. In short, the existing markets  and fairs served as a good starting point for 
the development of market economic activities8.  
 
The „household responsibility system“ and the favourable market situation, which was 
strongly supported by an expanded demand due to the increase of wages in the industrial 
sector and an increase in planned price for agricultural products, generated a great incentive 
for the farmers to raise their production. The success of the rural reform responded very soon 
(see Figure 1).  
 
1.2 Decentralised Industrialisation 
 
Based on an improved financial situation in the rural area,  the so called township- village 
enterprises (TVEs) were founded in large numbers. They are mostly engaged in non-
agriculture production. The rural area underwent an industrialisation process during the 
reform period. This development can be clearly seen in the composition of the social product 
in the rural area (see Figure 2 and Table 1.3). 
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Figure 2 Shares of Social Products in Rural Area  
 
The first year in Figure 1 is 1980 the last is 1992. Until 1985 the rural production was still 
concentrated in agriculture, after 1985 it was shifting continuously from agricultural to 
industrial production. 
 
By the end of 1991, the industrial production had outweighed the agricultural production in 
the rural area. Obviously, the economic reform was marked by a rapid development from 
rural-agricultural to urban-industrial activities in terms of dualistic economics. The TVEs 
were founded through self-financing, and therefore independent from any state planning. 
From the very beginning they operated according to the market principle, because their 
                     
8For details about the existing market, compare Byrd, William (1991), p.44 ff.  
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existence depended fully on their economic success. Due to the increasing share of the 
production of the TVEs in the whole economy, market activities played a more and more 
important role in the economy. A shift from plan to market took place continuously with the 
industrialisation process. This decentralised industrialisation became a key driving force for 
the transition from plan to market. The TVEs are now the most active force in Chinese 
Economy (see Table 1.4).9 
 
 
The dramatic development of the TVEs is favoured by the following factors: (1) The rural 
reform freed the farmers from the tight organisation of the early production teams. The 
increased productivity in the agriculture made it possible for the peasants to engage 
themselves in non-agricultural production. The newly established incentive system promoted 
an entrepreneurial spirit, and the rapidly raised income in the rural area formed the starting 
capital for the entrepreneurial undertakings. (2) A comprehensive market was established, 
consisting of the markets and fairs in rural area, and the so called secondary market beside the 
planned economy, which was tolerated and later accepted by the planning authority during the 
economic reform. Within the „two-tiers“-system this secondary market was legitimated and 
developed rapidly. This market became the environment of independent enterprises, since 
both input and output were available and could be sold on the market. (3) The disequilibrium 
situation of the planned segment ─ the unsatisfied demand of state-owned enterprises and 
consumers ─ favoured the existence and growth of the TVEs10. (4) The support of the local 
government was also very important for the growth of TVEs. Because the TVEs were the 
most important income source for the local governments, they supported the enterprises by 
providing infrastructure, and especially, by gathering credit for the enterprises. (5) The 
widespread industrial sector, which was founded during the three decades before the reform, 
provided sufficient technological precondition for the TVEs to get a start with the 
industrialisation in the rural area. In particular, the location of the industry in underdeveloped 
rural areas, which was pursued during the cultural revolution as a kind of strategic policy, 
revealed the long run effect in the 80s and 90s.   
 
Table 1.4 shows that from 1978 to 1992 the ratio of gross production value of the TVEs to 
that of the state-owned enterprises increased from 0.11 to 0.76. Hence, the production growth 
of township village enterprises accounts for a great part of the overall growth of the economy. 
These figures indicate typically the Chinese pattern of the transition: growing out of plan. 
 
1.3 Urban Reform 
 
„Incentive“ and „efficiency“ were also the key words in the urban reform. Similar to the start 
of rural reform, the first reform effort in industry was carried out around 1980 through re-
executing the consolidation policy of the early 1960s. This was designed to improve the 
performance of the state-owned enterprises within a framework dominated by mandatory 
output planning and administrative allocation of inputs and products through a restricted 
material incentive system.11 This reform consisted mainly of two components. First, the 
state-owned enterprises were allowed to retain a modest share of total profits, which 
previously had to be completely transferred to the state, so that now the state-owned 
                     
9For detail discussion about township- village enterprises, see Shen Guanbao (1991) p.158 ff. 
10Peking Rundschau 1983 Vol.50 P.22-26. 
11See also, Jefferson and Rawski (1994),p.50 ff.  
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enterprises would have more incentive to perform more efficiently. The free disposal of 
this profit on the enterprise level expanded the activities outside the plan, even if they were 
very modest at the very beginning. Second, a premium system was reintroduced in the 
industrial enterprises to motivate both executives and workers. This was the first increment of 
the average wage for more than 20 years. This policy led to a growth of the final demand and 
created a favourable condition for the formation of free markets in the economy. 
 
The result of these reform measures was the establishment of a material incentive and 
expansion of the activities outside the planned economy. The response to the reform can be 
seen in Table 1.5. 
 
In comparison to the success in the agriculture between 1978 and 1984, the achievement in 
the industry during the same time was very modest. This difference in the development was 
compelling enough to adopt the experience of the rural reform into the industry. Meanwhile 
the secondary market had expanded massively. Many transactions were made outside the 
planning12. The executives of the state-owned enterprises knew well the advantage of selling 
the products on the secondary market at a higher price. Hence, there formed a strong request 
for a price reform from the state-owned enterprises. 
 
In 1984 a further set of reforms was undertaken. It consisted of the "tow-tiers system" and the 
"contract responsibility system". Quite in the spirit of the traditional Chinese philosophy 
school  of the golden mean, the „two-tiers system“ was neither a clear decision for market nor 
for plan, but just a mixture of them. In the „two-tiers“ system, the supply of industrial 
products was portioned into planned and market economic components. The central planning 
covered only a part of the production capacity. The transaction within the plan supply was 
made at planned prices. This planned supply was formally guaranteed through the contract 
responsibility system. Under this system the enterprise had to fulfil specified obligations, that 
included, typically, the amount of production and profits that had to be delivered to the state. 
Beyond these obligations, the enterprises were encouraged to produce and sell their products 
on the market at the market price, which responded to relation of supply and demand on the 
market.  
 
The „two-tiers“ system legitimated the activities in the existing secondary market and 
promoted this kind of market activities13. Because the activities on the market had a higher 
financial return than the activities within the plan, profit-oriented enterprises had no incentive 
for investment in the plan portion but to put their funds in the more profitable market portion. 
This led to the tendency towards „growing out of plan“. „This tendency to grow out of the 
plan could be offset by investment funds being ploughed into expansion of the planned sector. 
But the state budget now accounts for a much lower share of the total investment than in the 
past“14 (see Table 1.6). Based on the activities outside the central planning, a large number 
of new profit-oriented enterprises were founded. Although many of them were supported by 
state-owned or collective enterprise, and thus, they belonged, so far the property right is 
concerned, to the group of state-owned or collective enterprise, they were however not 
integrated into any planning. They operated as independent enterprises, whose existence and 
                     
12For details see: Wu Jinglian and Zhao Renwei(1987), p.319 ff. 
13For a detail discussion about the impact of the two tiers system on the economy ses:Byrd, 
William A. (1987) p.295-308 
14Compare: Byrd, William A.(1987), p.299.  
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growth  depended  fully  on  their  economic  success. Accordingly, a new type of 
employment emerged, the so called "contract worker". In contrast to the traditional 
employment relationship in state-owned enterprises, where employees were hired for their life 
with all the social benefits, the contract workers were hired for a limited time, and generally, 
with only a minimum of social benefits. 
 
In general, we say, that with the introduction of the „two-tiers system“ an economic 
framework for market activities began to establish, though this framework was not at all 
clearly defined, many important questions such as property rights, ownership, legal basis of 
an enterprise etc. remained and are even not answered up to today.  
 
 
1.4 Price Reform 
 
At the very beginning of the reform, the importance of a market-oriented price forming was 
already recognised by the reformers. Various reform measures were undertaken to drive the 
price away from bureaucratic control towards the market price formation. 
 
In line with the rural reform, the market for agricultural sideline products was set free, and the 
prices were flexibly determined according to the demand and the supply situation on the 
market. This was the first step in the price reform. Since 1984, corresponding to the „two-tiers 
system“, a so called „dual price system“ was practised in the economy. The „dual price 
system“ meant, that there were two different prices for the same kind of products in the 
economy. As some of the products had to be sold at the planned price according to the plan, 
the other could be dealt on the market at a market price, which was, in general, much higher 
than the planned price.  
 
Before the introduction of the „dual price system“, the transaction outside the central plan and 
the flexible prices were viewed as a kind of activities in the „grey strip“. The „dual price 
system“ provided a kind of legal basis for these activities. With the introduction of the „dual 
price system“, prices of a large category of goods were set totally free. Actually, the number 
of the categories of materials controlled by the state reduced from 256 to 23 in 198515. At the 
end of 1980s most prices, except the prices for basic food, energy products and some raw 
materials, were set free. In 1993 even the prices for basic foods were freed from planning. 
 
Along with the progress in the price reform, a material incentive system was gradually 
forming. The market saw a flourish of development after 1984. Through the involvement in 
the market activities, the executives of the state-owned enterprises became more and more 
conscious of the economic interest of the autonomy of enterprises. Although the „dual price 
system“ and the „two-tiers system“ were originally designed to make the economy more 
flexible and more efficient with the help of market elements in the planned economy, they 
generated also unexpected effects, which influenced directly the plan execution and forced the 
plan system to change itself. Wu and Zhao summarised these effects as: „hypocritical 
behaviour by enterprises, loss of objective standard for performance assessment by the state, 
induced smuggling in distribution and irrational utilisation of resources“16. The effects 
                     
15For details see: Wu and Zhao (1987) p.312 ff. 
 
16Wu and Zhao (1987), p. 312 ff.  
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pictured negatively by Wu and Zhao,  expressed  just  that  the  forces  of  market  went 
its way whether it was wished or not. The plan became more and more indicative17. 
 
 
1.5 Shift from Plan to Market 
 
The response to the „two-tiers system“ was immediate and tremendous. The data from the 
National Conference on Material Flow in the early 1986 indicated that the planned allocation 
of coal, timber, steel and cement to enterprises fell respectively by 50%, 30.7%, 56.9%  and 
19.4% in 198518. Surveys of state-owned enterprises show a clear shift from plan to market. 
The share of material input purchased through the market rose from 12% to 66%, from 1980 
to 198919. The output sold on the market rose from 13% to 66% in the same time20. The 
investment financed by bank credits and by self-financing of the enterprises took 
continuously larger share in the whole investment. (see Table 1.6 and Figure 1.6)  
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Figure 1.6 Composition on Investment by Source 
 
In an increasingly market-like environment, where the incentive had established, the 
competence of the enterprise had expanded and the competition from the market was always 
effective, the state-owned enterprises tended to become a cost minimiser. The empirical 
evidence confirmed this tendency21.  
 
Even more far-reaching was the impact of the „dual prices system“ with its built-in-dynamics 
to overcome the planning system altogether. The large price difference between the plan price 
                     
17For details see: Naughton, Barry (1990), p.743-767. 
18Source: Wu and Zhao Dual (1987),p.309-318.  
19Caimao Jinji 1992 3-15 
20Compare: Jefferson Rawski (1994) p.51. 
21Compare: Jefferson and Rawski (1994) p.55.  
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and the market price, and the increased involvement  in  the  market  resulted  in  a  rapid 
rise in costs and a fall in profits in the state-owned enterprises, so that the government 
revenue from the enterprises could not benefit from the growth in the industry (See Table 
1.5). 
 
This fact produced inevitably a strong pressure from both the enterprises and from the 
planning authority, to raise the plan price. An adaptive adjustment of the plan price to the 
market price took place. 
 
The increase of the production capacity contributed to by market activities and the adaptive 
adjustment of the plan price to the market price led to the convergence of the two prices. This 
process went so far, that  the plan allocation lost more and more of its effectiveness. For 
example, in  1992 the difference between the state-controlled grain price and the market price 
was so negligible, that most people bought the grain from the private supplier for better 
service. This led to the totally free setting of the grain price in 1993. In 1993 the plan 





The Chinese economy experienced one of the fastest growth periods of all countries in the 
world in the last 25 years. It seems to be on the way towards a successful transition from a 
planned to a market economy, while most other post-socialist countries suffer from economic 
and social problems − the so called transition crisis. The question naturally arises: what are 
the specific reasons for the Chinese economy to perform differently than the post-socialist 
countries? To answer the question we can sketch out four hypotheses as a means to 
summarise the Chinese special development. 
 
The first hypothesis is that the gradual approach to the transition from plan to market  in 
China has protected the old economic structure and the planned economic mechanism from a 
sudden collapse and, thus, avoided a radical decline of the domestic production, to which 
social disturbance would always be connected. The transition is driven by the rapid growth of 
the newly emerged market sector in the economy. The state-owned enterprises did not suffer 
from any radical structure changes. By contrast, they could profit from the general favourable 
economic boom situation, such that they could develop rather well. 
 
This gradual approach to the transition was, in fact, a de facto result of the economic 
development stimulated by a series of reform policies, most of which were originally 
designed to enforce the growth of the planned economy and were, by no means, aimed at any 
kind of transition towards a market economy23. The built-in mechanism of market had driven 
the Chinese economy on the way to a market economy. In this sense, the transition in China 
was a „by-product“ of the economic reform rather than a designed political target. 
 
In the Communiqué of the third congress of the 11th plenum of the CPC, which is considered 
as the document of the beginning of the economic reform, the market was not a topic. Even 
the word ´market´ did not appear in the document. Obviously, the policy makers had not 
thought anything about the market. The reform effort in the industry in 1979 was designed to 
                     
22Source: Su in Jefferson and Rawski (1994) p.69. 
23Perkins, Dwight (1994), p.24  
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give the state-owned enterprises more vitality and to let them work more actively through 
setting up a material incentive system in the state-owned enterprises, but not to make any 
essential change in the planned economic system.  
In the „CCCP Decision about the Economic System Reform“, which is considered as the most 
important document on the urban reform in 1984, it was stated that „the socialist economy is a 
planned commodity economy based on public ownership. It is not that kind of market 
economy, that is fully regulated by market mechanism.“ At that time the policy makers were 
aware of some functions of market through the successful reform practice in the rural area, 
but they were not willing to give up the doctrine of the „superiority of planned economy“. 
„The planned economy should play the central role and the market adjustment should play the 
subsidiary role.“ The policy makers wanted to make the planned economy more effective with 
the help of a market, that had done very well in the agriculture. The „two-tiers system“ and 
the „dual price system“ were supposed to give the state-owned enterprises more autonomy, so 
that they could better cope with the new situation in the economy and the economy may 
function more efficiently. „Plan influencing and market fine tuning“ summarises the main 
ideal of this policy.  
 
In 1987 the second stage of urban reform began. There was no remarkable political intention 
in the direction of transition from plan to market. The political design of the policy makers 
stayed on the level of 1984. In the document of the 13th Plenum of CCCP the economy was 
defined as „ a socialist planned commodity-economic system, which should be an inherent 
unity of plan and market.“ The wide spreading of the „responsibility contract system“ was an 
experiment in seeking for a new organisational form in the planned economy. 
 
In 1992 decentralised market activities had long since been a reality in the economy. With the 
breaking down of the socialist block in eastern Europe, „planned economy“ was naturally 
connected „failure economy“. To rescue itself from the political crisis lasted since 1989, the 
policy makers in China urgently needed a new orientation. The „socialist market economy“ as 
a political slogan was born in this situation. Although no one knew, how this system should 
function in the reality, the combination of ´socialist´ and ´market economy´ is something, that 
the policy makers had been searching for. On the one hand, the attribute „socialist“ claims the 
leading pretension of the Communist Party of China, on the other hand, through the phrase 
„market economy“ a difference should be made clear between the Communist Party of China 
and its former colleagues in eastern Europe. The economic reform in China is still a project 
without a blueprint. However, why is there any need for a blueprint, now that it has done well 
without any blueprint?  
 
The second hypothesis is that the rural reform and the urban reform changed the 
industrialisation mechanism in the economy and provided favourable conditions for a 
decentralised industrialisation and urbanisation process. This process was characterised by a 
rapid growth of the non-agricultural production in the rural area. The share of industrial 
production in the domestic production increased rapidly. As the result of decentralised 
industrialisation, the newly formed TVEs and other non-state-owned enterprises were profit-
oriented. These profit-oriented enterprises took the advantage of their flexibility and could 
grow faster then the state-owned enterprises. Consequently, the share of the planned activities 
in the economy decreased, while the share of market activities increased. In short, the rapid 
growth led to the special pattern of transition -„growing out of plan“. 
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The third hypothesis is that the rapid market  oriented  growth  has  widely  hidden  the 
structural problems24, which are inevitable in the reform of the old economic structure with 
the planned economic organisation and the planned co-ordination system. On the one hand, 
the rapid growth of the market activities could overweigh the decline of the production, which 
would have occurred, if there has not been such a rapid growth of market activities. On the 
other hand, the rapid growth of the market activities enhanced the market force and 
strengthened the competition in the economy. This, in turn, motivated and forced the policy-
makers to adjust the planned activities to the new situation and make the planned segment 
become more and more market-like, because this seemed to be the only way for it to survive 
in the economy. 
 
To interpret the reform measures as a forced adjustment to the market situation sheds new 
light on the gradual approach of reform. We could compare the Chinese policy-maker without 
a blueprint with a „blind“ man, who could not see the way from plan to market, but the 
challenge from the market segment would serve him as a best „seeing-eye dog“, who would 
know instinctually the way to market.  
 
The fourth hypothesis is the logical implication of the former three. If the former three 
hypotheses are correct, the issues about the transition from plan to market will be passé, since 
the existing market force will drive the transition process automatically. The policy makers do 
not need to bother any more about, how to promote the transition process. The main focus of 
the attention should be, how to cope with the negative effects of the market.  
                     
24For detail discussion of the problem in transition see: Schmieding,  H. (1993), p. 233.  
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Section 2  
 
A Theoretical Model for Transition Process 
 
2.1 General Approach 
 
The economy during the transition from plan to market can be viewed as a mixture of 
centrally planned economic activities and free market economic activities. Changes in this 
mixture in favour of the market activities is the transition from plan to market. In this context, 
we should distinguish between two kinds of changes during the transition from plan to 
market. The first one, is the quantitative expansion of the market activities. The other kind is 
the change in the planned activities, where the planning behaviour becomes increasingly 
market-like, due to the reforms and the adjustments to the new situation in the economy. We 
call it an intrinsic transition.  
 
The overall state of the economic system during the transition depends on, which kind of 
transition form plays the dominant role in the system. If the extrinsic transition is the 
dominant one, the overall transition process will be a smooth process, which can be properly 
described in the framework of a growth model. If the intrinsic transition plays the governing 
role, the system behaviour will be turbulent, according to the chosen policies25. 
 
The model is constructed with two segments, plan and market, and two sectors, industry and 
agriculture to reflect the particular economic structure in China during the transition process. 
The transition from plan to market is described as the change of the relative weight of the two 
economic segments in the whole economy.  
 
At the outset, there exists a certain productive capacity in the planned economic segment 
already. This subsystem bears the basic features of a centrally planned economy: 
 
1)  The prices in this segment are fix (determined by the planning authority). 
2)  There exists no equilibrium in this segment. 
3)  The production structure is rigid (shares of investment products and consumer 
products do not react to the demand situation).  
 
The market economic segment, contrary to the planned economic segment, is a newly 
emerged subsystem. But the functioning of this subsystem carries the basic features of a free 
market economy: 
 
1)  The producers are price-taker and they are in pursuit of maximal profits   under  the 
given conditions on the market. 
2)  The prices response to the demand and the supply on the market and, thus  keep 
supply and demand in balance. 
3)  The allocation of resources is determined according to the supply and   demand  on 
the market. 
                     
25 Most of current literature about the transition from plan to market focuses on the transition topics in the 
sense of  intrinsic transition. There are many unsolved theoretical problems concerning this form of transition25, 
These problems obstacle the theory from providing a good travel guide for the reform policy-makers to find 





We consider the economy as a closed one26 with an agricultural and an industrial sector, each 
of which produces a homogenous commodity. The output of agricultural good will only be 
consumed. The industrial output may be consumed or invested27. 
 
 




The production technology is expressed by a neo-classic production function with two 
homogeneous production factors: labour and capital. The production function is assumed to 
be twice differentiable and single valued with a constant return of scale28. 
 
 
  YF K L iP
i
iP iP = ( , )          ( 1 p )    
 
      with:  i = 1 denotes the agricultural sector. 
              i = 2 denotes the industrial sector. 
              The subscript P denote the planned segment 
    LiP: labour used in  i-th sector of the planned segment 
    KiP: capital used in  i-th sector of the planned segment 
    Y iP: production of the i-th sector of the planned segment 
 
The first partial differentials are supposed to be positive: FK L K
i
iP iP iP ′> (,) 0 ;  
FK L L
i
iP iP iP ′> ( , ) 0 and the second differentials to be negative: FK L K
i
iP iP iP ′′ < (,) 0 ;  
FK L L
i
iP iP iP ′′ < (,) 0 .  
 
At the very beginning, the technological progress is not considered, because the main interest 
lies in the analysis of the interaction between the two segments, which can be traced back 
institutionally but not technologically. Considering the special situation in China,  we assume 
the agricultural production takes place only in the market segment but not the planned 
segment. The influence of planning on the agriculture will be discussed later. Therefore, the 
following terms equal zero: K P 1 0 = , L P 1 0 =  and Y P 1 0 = .        
 
The total industrial production consists of the production of investment goods and the 
production of consumption goods. 
 
  Y I C P P P 222 =+       ( 2 p )  
 
 Planner’s Decision about factor demand 
 
                     
26Through the assumption of a closed economy we neglect the impact of international trade and foreign 
investment on the transition and industrialisation process. The importance of international trade and foreign on 
the industrialisation can be seen in Perkins (1994). 
27In the development-theoretical literature as by Fei and Ranis, and Jorgenson the industrial output is admitted 
for both consumption and investment purposes. 
28Non-constant return to scale has weakness in growth model, see Conlisk 1968.  
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We assume the price and the wage rate are fixed in the planed segment. All capital will 
be utilized. The labour  demand will decide according to cost minimizing principle: 
 











=          ( 3 p ) 29 
 
   
From (3p) we get the demand for labour as the function of  the real wage rate and the capital 
stock.  
 








= (,)         ( 3 p - b )  
 
To take into account the benefit provided by the SOEs beyond the wage bill, we assume 
further that the total wage rate consists of money wage rate and the benefit, and ratio between 
money wage rate and benefit is constant: 
  
b w w pp p + =  
 
p E pp w w ν =  
 
with   vE ≤1  
 
Because it always holds that KK P P 2 = , we consider later only K P 2 . The capital stock at each 
period is the past level minus depreciation plus investment: 
 
  Kt Kt It Kt P P P
P




The capital payment can be determined residually as the difference between the whole income 
and the labour payment.  
 
  r K r K P Y wL P P P P P P P P ==− 22 2 2        
 















The demand in the traditional CPE is always latent and plays no effective role in the 
                     
29We have get this condition from the maximising behaviour of 
the planner. It suits especially the case before the economic 
reform. But this condition implies also cost minimising 
behaviour, if the price and the wage rate are kept fix.  
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economy. While the market segment emerges  in the economy, the demand, that is originally 
kept latent through the supply constraint, can be articulated now on the free market. 
Concerning the disposition of the income, we make the assumption of the classical saving 
behaviour30. We assume that the labour incomes will all be consumed, and that the saving 
fraction of the capital income is sr and the savings will be directly used for investment by the 
planner. Thus we get nominal demand for consumption from the planned segment: 
  
  NC w L s r K P
d
P P r P P =+ − () 1 ,       ( 5 p )  
 
and nominal demand for investment from the planned segment: 
 
  NI s r K P
d
r P P = .          ( 6 p )  
 
As discussed in section 2, the practice in the planned economy will lead to a shortage of 
supply for consumption. The determination of the realised share of investment goods and 
consumer goods in the total production is a very complicated matter, in which the ideological 
doctrine and economic calculation, as well as, the bureaucratic practice are entangled. To 
simplify the complication, we adopt the Koran’s hypothesis of the „constant relation31“ and 









= µ         ( 7 p )  
 
We assume, that the realised supply of consumption can not be larger than the demand, so that 
the difference between demand and supply is always positive. We can take this difference 
between the nominal demand and nominal supply as a measurement of the disequilibrium and 
denote it as E:  
 
  EN C P C P
d
P P =− 22         ( 8 p )  
or 
  EP I N I P P P
d =− 22         ( 8 p - b )  
 
The equation (8p-b) seems at first glance to be an excess supply of the investment good, that 
would be contradictory to the specific features of CPE, where there are shortages of supply in 
every sector as described in section two. The almost infinite demand for investment goods 
means, that the produced investment goods can always be sold. Under the soft budget 
constraint the investor does not pay much attention to the budget constraint. The spillover of 
the shortage of supply of consumer goods i.e. the forced saving, can, through the central 
planning, just cover the financial deficit expressed in (8p-b).  In the planned economic 
segment the willingness for investment is everywhere, as in a CPE32. The realised investment 
depends only on the financial capability of the planning authority. If forced saving exists, the 
total amount of investment is equal to the sum of the capital income and the forced saving. It 
should be noticed, that the forced saving and the financially uncovered investment demands 
take place at the same time. It is not the forced saving that causes the infinite demand for 
                     
30Marglin (1984): Growth, Distribution and Prices p.111. 
31Kornai (1980): „Economics of Shortage“, p.218 ff. 
32Jefferson, Gary H. and Rawski Thomas G. (1994): p.55  
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investment. By contrast, the quantity drive causes the over-evaluation of investment, that 
results in the insufficient production of  consumer goods and forced saving. 
 
 




Similar to the planned economic segment, the production technology in the market segment is 
assumed to be expressed through the same production function, 
 
  YF K L iM
i
iM iM = ( , )         ( 1 m - 2 m )  
 
   with:   
              The subscript M denote the market segment 
              KiM : capital stock i-th sector of the market segment 
              LiM: labour used in  i-th sector of the market segment 
    Y iM: production of the i-th sector of the market segment 
 
The industrial production consists of production of investment goods and consumption goods: 
 




The total capital stock in the market segment at period t is denoted as Kt M ()  and will be fully 
utilised in these two sectors.  
 
  Kt K t K t M M M () () () = + 12        ( 4 m )  
 
At the given period t, the total capital stock is determined by the level of last period plus the 
net investment: 
 
  Kt Kt It Kt M M M
m
M () ( ) () ( ) = −+ − − 11 δ        
 
We assume that the allocation of factors is efficient and the factors are paid at their marginal 


























=     i  =  1,2     (7m-8m) 
 
As in the planned economic segment, the labour demand can be expressed as a function of the 
capital stock and the real wage rate in this segment: 
 






= (,) .          
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The total employed labour is the sum of the labour employed in the two sectors.  
 
  LLL M M M =+ 12 .         ( 9 m )  
 
We assume that all the surplus labour force will be absorbed in the agriculture. Therefore, it 
must hold:  
 
  LL L M P G += 2          ( 1 0 m )  
 
Because the production function has a constant return of scale, the total income can be 
divided into capital income and labour income: 
 
  P Y wL r K iM iM iM iM iM iM = +  
 










         
 
We assume, that the capital movement within the market segment is subject to no institutional 
constraints and is, therefore, much more flexible. The capital movement will cease, if the 
rental rates are equal in both sectors. 
 
  r r r M M M 12 ==   .         ( 1 1 m )  
 
The total capital income and the total labour income are the sum of those incomes, 
respectively, in both sectors: 
 
  r K r KK M M M M M = + () 12       
 
  wL w L w L M M M M M M = + 11 22  
 
Wages and Labour 
 
We assume that  in the market segment the wage in industrial sector is the same as that in the 
planned segment without the additional benefit. 
 
   p E pp M w w w ν = = 2         ( 1 2 m )  
 
Due to the dualistic structure of the economy, there is a large labour force willing to work in 
the industrial sector, because the wage rate in the industry is higher than that of agriculture, at 
least at the beginning of the transition process. This tendency of labour movement leads the 
real wage rate to decrease to the minimum level in the industrial sector. This minimum level 
can be seen as some kind of existence minimum in the urban area. The rigidity of minimum 
level of real wage can be described through a wage function33, where the nominal wage is 
tied to the prices in a certain relationship. We assume, that the influence of agricultural 
                     
33For the use of wage function see: Motoshige Itoh and Takashi Negishi, (1987) p.6.  
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products is negligible in the determination of  the  consumption  level  for  the  industrial 
workers. Hence, the minimum wage can be written as follows: 
 
  wW P P M P M 22 2 = (, ) . 
 
We assume, that there is no money illusion and the minimum living standard in the urban area 
depends mainly on the price of industrial products. The wage functions become linearly 
homogenous in the prices. In our case, there are two prices for a same product. The minimum 
wage condition takes following form: 
 
  wPP M E P M 22 2 1 =+ − δ λ λ (( ) ) .        ( 1 3 m )  
 
λ is the weight of the product from the planned segment in the whole economy. This wage 
function says simply, that the nominal wage is proportional to the average price for the 
industrial products, that is expressed through λ λ PP P M 22 1 + − () . δE is the minimum level of 












For the agricultural product, we assume an inelastic demand:34 
 
  YL M
d
G 1 = ε .          ( 1 4 m )  
 
ε is the amount of food needed per capita. 
 
For the disposition of labour income and capital income, we make a similar assumption as we 
have done for the planned segment. Thus the nominal demand for consumption is: 
 
  NC w L w L s r K M
d
M M M M r M M =++ − 11 22 1 ( )      ( 1 5 m )  
 
The nominal demand for investment is: 
 
  NI s r K M
d
r M M =        ( 1 6 m )  
 
 
2.4 Market Balance 
 
For a pure market economy, it is quite natural to accept the conception of equilibrium, as 
suggested by the general equilibrium theory. The existence of the planned economic segment 
in this model affects through the deficit in supply of consumption product expressed by E. If  
production and prices of the market segment are flexible enough, so that they can cover this 
deficit, then there will be an equilibrium. If the deficit can not be covered by the production 
from the market segment, there will be no equilibrium and then there exist forced saving and 
                     
34 More general assumption about the demand for agricultural products would be that after reaching a certain 
level(ε), the expenditure for agricultural products takes a small and decreasing share in the total consumption 
expenditure. Compare. Kelly et al (1972) p.44 ff.  
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forced substitution. The condition of the equilibrium on the commodity markets can be 
put as follows: 
 
  YY M
d
M 11 =          ( 1 7 m )  
 
   PI N I E MM M
d
22=−         ( 1 8 m )  
 
   PC N C PY E MM M
d
MM 22 1 1 =− +       ( 1 9 m )  
 
According to Walras´ law, one of the three equations is dependent on the other two, so we 
need to study only two of them. This equilibrium condition can be understood as follows: The  
existence of the planned segment results in a deficit of supply for consumer goods in the 
planned segment. The market force adjusts the production and the price for the consumer 
goods in the market segment, so that this deficit is closed. At the same time, the supply and 
the demand for the  investment good is also brought into balance.  
 
 
2.7 Temporal Equilibrium 
 
We say the model is in an equilibrium, if some positive prices P M 1 ,P M 2 , M r , M w 2 , M w1  exist, 
such that the equations of  market balance (18m), (19m) and (20m) and the equations of factor 
utilization (4m), (10m) can be fulfilled. That means market prices can keep the total demand 
and total supply for agricultural product and industrial products for consumption and for 
investment in balance respectively. 
 
In order to study the property of equilibrium we make following assumptions in addition to 




G M M L L K F δ > ) , ( 
 
This is an assumption that the agricultural production is able to provide surplus for 

















 This assumption is to interpret that the planned real wage rate should 
above the existence minimum. Implication of this assumption is that the market price will be 





2 P L w E E p p δ − <   
This assumption implies that even under forced saving the per capital real consumption in the 
planned segment should be over the existence minimum. 




Under A1, A2, if E=0 there exits an unique stable equilibrium for the model specified from 




Under A1, A2, A3 and E>0 there exits a constant  K τ  such that (1) there is no equilibrium for 




Under A1, A2, A3,  M K  will grow faster than  P K . 
 
Colloray 3.1 




Once the model is in an equilibrium state, its evolution will always in the equilibrium state.  
 
2.6 Long Run Dynamics 
 
The long run dynamic behaviour of the system depends on how fast capital stocks grow in 
each segments. At the beginning of the transition, it holds typically  K M P K K τ > / . Following 
proposition 2 there is no equilibrium for the model. According to proposition 3,  Mt Pt K K / will 
become smaller and smaller. Consequently the system will evolve from disequilibrium to 
equilibrium. We call process during disequilibrium state the complementary stage. In this 
stage the model is overall in disequilibrium,  the market segment reduces the disequilibrium 
to some extend but can not totally compensate it.  
 
According to Proposition 3  P K will grow slower than  M K . Once   K M P K K τ < /  the model will 
be in an equilibrium. We call this stage the transitional stage.  
 
The wage rate in the agricultural sector keeps increasing during the transitional stage. Once it 
approaches the wage rate in the industrial sector, the labour surplus disappears. The real wage 
rate in the market segment will start to increase. The market price for industrial product will 
decrease. The planned segment will face hard competition from the market and it is forced to 





Analysis of the Driving Forces of the Transition 
 
The transition process in the model is described by the difference in growth between the two 
segments. Driving forces of the transition are those that can influence the growth in both the 
market segment and the planned segment. In the following section, we will analyse these 
forces and examine their impact on the transition process. 
 
 
3.1 The Planned Segment and Kalecki´s Model 
 
In our model, the growth mechanism of the planned segment has the pattern of the growth in 
Kalecki´s Model. Suppose the price and the wage rate in the planned segment are given 
exogenously. From the linear homogenous production we find that the cost minimising labour 
demand depends linearly on the capital stock.  
 














Thus the production depends also linearly on the capital stock. 
 




































= φ α α ) , 1 ( ) , (  
 
The increment of production results from the increment of the capital stock. 
 




































= ∆ ) (  
 










φ δ or gc + = − φ φ δ 
 
  with:  i
I
Y
=  share of productive accumulation, 
   c
C
Y
=  share of consumption. 
 
If we compare this equation with the fundamental equation in Kalecki´s model we see that the 
equation in our model is a special case with a production function of constant returns to scale. 
 
As φ δ −  is independent from the decision, the decision about the growth is a „trade off“ 
between the growth rate and the contemporary consumption. This is exactly the growth 
pattern described by Kalecki. Because wage income is the main source of consumption, the 
political desire for quick growth is instrumentalised through keeping the wage rate at a low 
level. The evidence for the pursuit of this policy is the fact that in China despite a rather  
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considerable growth rate of the GNP during  the sixties and seventies, there was no 
remarkable improvement of the living standard. In fact the real average wage in 1983 did not 
reach the level of that in 195735. Nevertheless, even this low level of consumption could not 
be satisfied, because in the practice of CPE the production of consumer goods often had to 
give way to the production of investment goods.(see Table 3.1)  
 
During the economic reform this kind of growth pattern changed significantly. First, the 
source of growth came not only from investment in the planned segment, but much more from 
that in the market segment. The supply deficit of consumer goods in the planned segment was 
met through the transaction between the planned segment and the market segment. At same 
time, the investment goods produced in the planned segment were bought by the market 
segment to enlarge the production capacity there. The rate of growth was the result of the 
equilibrium state determined by the market forces. The CPE specific logic of the growth 
mechanism, - “the trade-off between growth and contemporary consumption“-, does not 




3.2 Market Segment and Dualistic Economic Model 
 
The dualistic features of the model are expressed through the asymmetric treatment of the two 
sectors in market segment. According to Kelley, „the existence of dualism has been argued on 
the basis of difference in (1) social system, (2) racial or ethnic background, (3) production 
condition, (4) demographic behaviour, (5) consumer expenditure and consumer savings 
behaviour, and (6) the domestic and foreign sectors.“36 In our model the dualism lies, first, in 
the differential production condition. The production in the agricultural sector is assumed to 
be always more labour intensive than in the industrial sector. Second, the agricultural sector is 
expected to absorb all the labour forces, which can not be utilised in the industrial sector. 
Although the wage rate in the industrial sector is postulated at a level of existence minimum 
in the urban areas, the wage rate in the agricultural sector lies even lower, which implies that 
the living standard is different in the rural and urban areas. Third, we have assumed 
asymmetric consumer expenditure in two sectors. (For simplicity the demand for agricultural 
product was assumed to be inelastic.)  
 
If we would neglect the planned segment, the model would become a dualistic model in a two 
sectors neo-classic general equilibrium framework. (The model could also be viewed as a 
special case of the dualistic model developed by Kelley Williamson and Cheetham37.) The 
growth in the market segment will lead to the structural change in the economy, due to the 
dualistic properties of the two sectors in the economy. This structural change is to be 
understood as the process of industrialisation, where the share of industrial production is 
increasing and the labour force moves from agriculture into industry continuously. Now it is 
natural to raise the question, why this industrialisation process did not take place earlier? In 
the following section, we will explain why this industrialisation process did not take place 
until the beginning of the economic reform. 
  
 
                     
35See Chinese Statistic Year book 1988 p.190 Tab.4-35. 
36See:Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham (1972) p.8-9. 
37 See:Kelley, Williamson, and Cheetham (1972).  
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3.3 The Rural Reform and the Stimulation  of Transition 
 
The Chinese agriculture feeds more than 1 billion people and provides jobs for more than 
80% of them in 1978. Before the economic reform, the agriculture in China was integrated in 
the planning system through an obligated quantity planning and a strict price control. 
Moreover, peasants were only allowed to engage in the agricultural production. Any activities 
in other sector were strictly controlled through the bureaucratic administration. The farmers 
had to fulfil the planned target of production. They had to deliver to the state a given amount 
of food, that was needed by the people living in the urban area, and they had to produce 


















 with: P P 1  the planned price for agricultural product 
     w1
o the prevailing wage rate     
 
The amount of capital stock is irrelevant, because farmers could only use their capital in the 
agriculture. However, before the reform, they had to carry out the production plan of the state, 
even if it was economically unprofitable. We assume, that the planned amount was higher 
than the optimal amount, such that the agricultural production was running unprofitably. The 
surplus labour force was another burden of the agriculture. We can demonstrate the situation 
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Graph 5.1. Influence of planning on agriculture 
 
The optimal decision for the farmer would be L M
opt
1
. with a production amount Y M
opt
1
. lower than 
the planned production Y M
P
1 . Because the planned target was obligatory, everything would be 
done to fulfil the plan. That means more labour input would be used, even if the marginal 
productivity was lower than the real wage rate, which is supposed to have reached its lower 
limit. Another reason for the unprofitable using of labour in the agriculture was that the 










sector.38 This economic loss through using  surplus labour results in reduction of the 


































The capital income can be determined residually from the difference between total income 















If the price is so low, that the rental rate of capital can only keep pace with the depreciation, 
the marginal labour productivity will not rise. Consequently, the labour productivity, and 
thus, the living standard of the farmers can not get decisive improvement. The agricultural 
production available for the state can not rise as well, i.e. there is no chance for the agriculture 
to get a remarkable improvement. Before the reform, the low planned price of agriculture 
product and the bureaucratically controlled production manner had been the main obstacle to 
the development in the rural area. It destroyed the economic vitality of agriculture, so that a 
spontaneous industrialisation became economically impossible. 
 
 
In the Table 3.2, we can see, that from the beginning of the sixties to the beginning of the 
economic reform (in 1978), the planned price did not change significantly.  
 
The rising price of agricultural products, as practised at the beginning of the rural reform and 
the decollectivization has given a big push in the development of agriculture. 
                     






















Graph 3.2. Impact of rural reform on agriculture 
 
There are two direct effects resulting from rising the prices. First, the rising price leads to 
increases in the rental rate of the capital. The farmers are able to put more capital into 
production, which in turn leads to increases in labour productivity. The production curve 
turns upwards. Second, the real wage rate in terms of agricultural price will decrease, thus it 
is more profitable to use the labour force than before the reform. These two effects result in 
increasing production. If the increase of the production is big enough, so that the supply of 
agricultural products at the old level of the labour input is larger than the food demand, the 
level of employment in the agriculture will go down. Marginal productivity will rise in 
agriculture. The improvement of the farmers’ living standard will be economically founded. 
From then on, the expansion of the capital stock in the rural areas and the labourers freed 
from agriculture will transfer into industrial production. We assume that before the rural 
reform the planned price for agricultural products was set so low that it suppressed the vitality 
of the industrialization on the rural area, even if the technological condition for such 
industrialization was mature. The increased price for agricultural product at the beginning of 
the rural reform stimulated this industrialization process. 
 
 
3.4 Savings and Financial Market 
 
In the previous discussion, we have assumed, that the wage saving fraction is zero and that of  
capital income is 100%. A more realistic assumption would be 01 ≤ ≤ ≤ ss wM r  and 
01 ≤≤ ≤ ss wP r , where  sss wM wP r ,,  are the saving fractions of labour income in the market 
segment, the plan segment and the  saving fraction of capital income, respectively. 
Accordingly the shortage of supply of consumer products in the planned segment can be 
written as: 
 
   E sw L s r KP C wP P P r P P P P = − + − − () ( ) 11 22 >0    (8pb) 
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=+ + + + ()
    (18mb) 
 
or   PI s r K s Lw Lw E MM r MM w M M M M M 22 2 2 1 1 = + + − () . 
 
If we replace the (8p) and (18m) in the original model by (8pb) and (18mb) above we find, 
that the saving behaviour only influences the distribution of the production between the 
consumer goods and investment goods within the industrial sector. The argument for the 
existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium also holds in this case as in section 2.  
 
However, with different saving behaviours, the dynamics of the capital accumulation should 
be modified accordingly. We assume that all savings from labour income will be used for 
investment through the financial system, which is still under rather strong central control. It 
becomes essential, how the savings from the labour income are distributed in the two 
segments. We suppose that the savings of the capital income will be used for the investment 
in the same segment. We denote κ as the share of savings from labour income, which is used 
for investment in the plan segment. The capital stock accumulation in the two segments can 
be described through following two equations. We denote the sum of savings from the labour 
income with Ss L w L w s L w wM M M M M wP P P =+ + () 11 22 . 
 







P r P κ δ ρ + + − =        ( A )  
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M r M κ δ ρ − + + − =       ( B )  
 
Similar to the case of the basic model, the difference between s r S K r P P +κ /  and 
s r S K r M M +− () / 1 κ  is key to the dynamic behaviour of the system. The difference depends 
first of all on the rental rate in both segments. It depends also on the distribution of  saved 
labour income. As discussed above, the rental rate in the market segment is higher than that in 
the planned segment. If the difference between the rental rates can outweigh the saving 
fraction (i.e. if it holds that, s r S K s r r P P r M + < κ / ), the market segment will always have a 
faster growth rate. The share of the planned segment in the economy will diminish. Of course, 
this assumption can hold, only if the saving fraction of labour income is very small. 
Generally, we may have to consider the case, where the inequality does not hold. In this case, 
the long run behaviour of the system depends on the distribution of the labour income saved. 
If there is no competitive financial market, which is exactly the case in China, the flow of the 
financial asset will run according to administrative rules. The simplest rule is that the 
distribution is held at a fixed ratio. κ is supposed to be constant between 0 and 1. For a given 
κ, even if s r SK r M M +− () / 1 κ  is larger than s r SK r P P +κ / , the share of the planned segment 
will not diminish, because the former will decrease faster than the latter, until they are equal. 
Then the planned segment will take a constant share in the economy. In case the former is 
smaller than the latter, the planned segment will grow faster. However, the difference 
between them will converge to zero, so that in the long run the growth rates in both segments 
will be equal.  
 
If the saving of labour income is distributed somehow competitively, the enterprises in the 
market segment have a better chance to get the financial asset than those from the planned 
segment. They can pay a higher interest rate, because the rental rate in the market segment is  
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higher. Suppose that the savings are  distributed in proportion to the capital stock 
in both segments, then κ can be calculated follows : 
 








The growth rates of the capital stock in both segments are: 
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11 22 () / ( ) /     (B) 
 
Obviously, the growth rate in the market segment will be higher than that in the planned 
segment, and thus, the share of the plan segment in the economy will diminish. In other 
words, the transition from plan to market will proceed. 
 
The discussion above has shown, that the reform of the financial market is crucial for the 
transition from plan to market. The transition process will be impeded, if the financial market 
is run administratively and the financial flow does not react to the situation on the market. 
The financial market will become even more important if the allocation of the capital income 
is also deposited on the financial market. 
 
 
3.5 The Tax Policy 
 
Tax policy is one of the most important instruments for the government to intervene in the 
economy, especially, in the market segment. In this section, we will analyse the influence of 
tax policy on the transition process. Because the transition from plan to market is understood 
as the increase/decrease in the share of market segment/(planned segment), we only have to 
examine the impact of tax policy on the growth of the capital stock in the two segments and it 
is important to distinguish between tax spent for consumption and for investment, because 
these two kinds of uses have a different impact on the growth of the capital stock. 
 
Tax Used for Consumption: 
 
We assume, that a constant tax rate is charged on the capital income39. This policy leads to a 
larger share in the investment income being used for consumption. For simplicity, we assume 
ss wM wP == 0. The shortage of supply for consumption products in the planned segment is 
expressed in the following equation: 
 
   Ew Lt r K s t r KP C PP r P P r r P P P P
° =+ + − − − () () 11 22     (9pc) 
 
The market balance for the investment good is expressed as: 
 
                     
39 The tax on wage is neglected, because the income of most wage-erners is well below the 
taxation limit.  
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   PI s tr K E M M r r M M 22 1 = − −
° ( )                  (18mc) 
 
and for consumer goods: 
 
   PC s trK wL w L t rK E M M r r M M M M M M r M M 22 1 1 22 11 =− − + + + +
° ( )( )     (19mc) 
 
Obviously the argument for the existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium solution 
holds here as in the case of the basic model in chapter 4. The difference is that the expenditure 
of tax income for consumption raises the final demand for consumption, so that the portion of 
consumer goods in the whole industrial production will increase. The growth of capital stocks 
in the two segments can be determined accordingly: 
 
  ρ δ P r r P st r P =− − () / 1 2         ( A c )  
        
  ρ δ P r r M st r P =− − () / 1 2         ( B c )  
 
These two equations differ from the equations (A) and (B) only in the positive factor 
st r r () 1− . Hence, the conclusion about the long run dynamic property of the system holds also 
in this case. The imposed tax only slows down the growth of the capital stocks in both 
segment. But the growth is faster in the market segment than in the planned segment, so that 
in the long run the share of planned segment will converge to zero. In other word, the 
transition will proceed.  
 
 
Tax used for investment in the planned segment: 
 
Is the tax income completely used for investment in the planned segment, the growth rate in 
the planned segment will naturally benefit. We examine in following the impact of this policy 
on the transition process. The deficit of supply for consumption in the planned segment is 
written: 
 
   Ew L t s r K P C PP r r P P P P =+ − − − () () 11 22      (8pd) 
 
The market balance condition for the investment goods in the market segment can be written 
as follows: 
 
   P I st r K E t r K M M r r M M r M M 22 1 = − − + ()      (18md) 
 
For the consumption products: 
 
   PC s tr Kw L w L E P Y M M r r M M M M M M M M 22 1 1 22 1 1 11 =− − + + + − () ()  (19md) 
 
Similar to the case of using tax income for consumption, the equilibrium solution is unique. 
However, the long run property of the system will change. Instead of the diminishing share of 
the planned segment in the economy, the planned segment will take at least a constant share  
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  ρ δ M r r M st r P = − − () / 1 2         ( B d )  
 






1−+ +  and st r r r M () 1−  is decisive for the long 
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1−+ +  holds. With the 
progress of the evolution, the difference between the growth rates in the two segments 
becomes increasingly smaller until they are equal. Both segments will then take a constant 
share in the economy and the  transition will cease. 
 
The tax income may also be used for investment in the market segments, through subsidies or 
supports for the enterprises of the market segment. For the long run dynamic property of the 
system, it becomes crucial, how total investment, that is financed through the tax income, is 
distributed between the two segments. Similar to the discussion in the section 5.4., we can 
conclude that, if the total investment fond is distributed with a constant fraction for each 
segment, both segments will have a constant share in the economy in the long run. The 
transition will not be carried out to the end. If the total investment fund is distributed in 
proportion to the production capacities of the two segments, the share of planned segment will 
converge to zero. The transition will proceed to the end. 
 
 
3.6 Adjustment of the Planned Segment 
 
With the appearance of the market segment, the economic environment changes in the 
economy. There are two prices for the same product. The first one is the planned price, which 
is determined and controlled by the planning authority. The second one is the market price, 
that results from the demand and the supply on the market and always lies above the planned 
price. The higher price in the market segment results in the higher rate of return of capital in 
the market segment, which leads in turn to the faster growth in the market segment. The 
flourishing in the market segment motivates the planned segment to adjust itself to the new 
situation. During the economic reform, where the profitability and efficiency of a enterprises 
is always the central topic of the management, the managers become conscious of the price as 
an instrument of management. In the following section, we will discuss a few variations of the 
price adjustment in the planned segment.  
 
 
3.6.1 Partial Price Adjustment: 
 
With partial price adjustment we mean a certain kind of price policy during the reform, where 
the planned price for the industrial good is raised to reduce its difference to the market price. 
Because the price raising implies, at same time, the radical decreasing of the real wage rate,  
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that would reduce the living standard of  workers and cause social disturbance, the 
planning authority tends to raise the wage rate in order to compensate the effect of the rising 
price. Generally we assume, that the ratio of wage rate to the planned price wP P P / 2  is kept at 
a constant level. 
 
Now we will examine the effects of this kind of policy. If the planned price for consumer 
goods is raised by ρ percent, the nominal wage rate will also be ρ percent higher. Owing to 
the fact, that the employment can not change in short time in the planned segment, the capital 
income will be changed. 
 
For the distribution of the factor income we get: 
 
   () () () 111 22 2 2 2 2 += ++ + ρ ρ ρ PY r K wL P P P P P P 
 
Thus the rental rate of capital in consumer sector will rise at ρ percent, as shown in the 
equation: 
 
   rr P P 22 1
* () =+ ρ  
 
The impact on the market segment is carried out through the deficit of supply of consumer 
goods. This is expressed as: 
  
   Ew L P Y P P P P = − 22         
 
As wP and P P 2  are increased by ρ percent and the y P 2  and L P 2  are unchanged, shortage of 
supply will increase by the same percentage. From the equation (13m) we can easily see, that 
the rising of the price does not affect the labour intensities in the two sectors of the market 





































− = − .       (13me) 
  
 
Because right hand side do not change, the price ratio and the real variables in the market 
segment will not change. Following (12m) all nominal variables of the market segment will 
rise by ρ percent. 
 
To summarise, the partial price adjustment causes the rising of all the monetary variables by ρ 
percent, as the real variables remain unchanged, so that the allocation of the resource and the 
difference between the growth rate also remain unchanged. In this context, the wage rate can 
be treated as the Walrasian numéraire in our model40.  
 
 
                     
40Brems, Hans. (1968), “Quantitative Economic Theory: A Synthetic Approach“,John Wiley 
& Sons,Inc. New York, London, and Sydney, 1968, p.256  
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3.6.2 Dual Prices 
 
The "two-tiers system" is another variant of the price reform. According to the „two-tiers 
system“, the state-owned company must fulfil certain plan targets. A certain amount of 
product has to be produced and sold at the planned price, but the company is free to dispose 
of the remaining product and its resources, after it has met the plan target. This policy has 
brought a new light into the management of the state-owned enterprises. The executives of the 
enterprises become more and more conscious of their own interests of the enterprise. Of 
course, it takes time for the executives of the state-owned enterprises to take advantage of this 
constrained freedom in the management and to adjust the production accordingly. So we will 
discuss two cases. In the first case, the production is determined independently from the 
market price, thus it is somehow exogenous. In the second case, the amount above the plan is 
determined in accordance with the market situation.  
 
For the first case: 
 








P P P 22 2 222 222 =+ =+ = +








22 2 , , : the plan target; YIC P P P 22 2
+ + + , , : the amount over the plan target and Y P 2 : the 
total amount of production.  
 
  PY PY rK wL P P
P
M P P P P P 22 2 2 += +
+  
 
The shortage of supply in the planned portion is expressed as: 
 
  Ew L P Y P P P P
P = − 22  
 
 
The market balance for the consumer goods is: 
 
  PC C w L w L E P Y M M P M M M M M M 22 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 () += + + −
+ .    (19mf) 
 
The market balance for the investment goods is: 
 
  PI I r K r KP I M M P M M P P P P
P
22 2 2 2 () += + −
+ ,       ( 1 8 m f )  
or 
  PI r K PC E M M M M M M 22 2 2 =+ −
+ . 
 






















































− = − +
+      ( 1 3 m f )  
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Because YK P M 2
+ /  is constant, the left hand  side of equation (13mf) is monotonously 
increasing in rM
41,  so the conclusion that the equilibrium solution exits and is unique will not 




































− + = − + − = °
+ +  
 
Obviously it holds, that D rM °() >D rM ()  and D rM ° ′ () >D rM () ′. This means, that assuming 
other conditions remain unchanged, the equilibrium rental rate of capital will be smaller. 
                     























Graph 3.3 Existence of  Equilibrium under Two-Tiers-System  
 
 
Under the dual price system, the state-owned enterprises could also profit from the liberal 
economic environment, through selling a part of the products at the higher market price.  
More production capacity is involved in the market-oriented production, such that the rental 
rate in the market segment decreases. (See Graph 3.3) Due to  the higher price of the product, 
the rental rate will increase in the planned segment. In spite of this,  the rental rate in the 
market segment is still higher than that in the planned segment. Therefore, the growth rate 
will be higher in the market segment.   
 
 
In the case of endogenous production, where the production in the planned segment is 
determined according to the market prices of the products, the equations for the system 
remain the same, but YK P M 2
+ /  is no longer exogenous. It will be determined according to the 
market situation. Generally, the over-plan-production is determined so, that the real wage rate 
equals  the marginal labour productivity.  
 


















′= ()  
The labour intensity in the planned segment can be seen as an increasing function of the 
wage-price ratio: 













2 2  
Because marginal productivity is decreasing, the labour intensity will increase with the 
market price. The market price increases with the rental rate in the market segment, so the 
Dr M
o()     D rM ()    
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labour intensity in the planned segment  increases with the rental rate. As the capital 
stock is constant, the over-production is an increasing function of rM. We denote the left hand 
side of equation (10m-c) as Dr M
>() 2 . Dr M
>() 2  is still monotonously increasing in rM. 
Therefore, there exists a unique solution to the equilibrium problem, which is expressed in the 
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Graph 3.3b Existence of  equilibrium under two-tiers-system  
 
3.6.3 Freeing up of the Price Control 
 
The last step of the price reform is to give up the planned price and let all prices respond 
freely to supply and demand of the market. The practice of this policy can be viewed as 
continuation of the two-tiers-policy, as the plan target becomes smaller and smaller. In this 
case, the minimum wage condition takes a very simple form: 
 
  wP M E M 22 = δ         ( 1 3 m h )  
 
This shows, that even if all the prices are set free, the wage-price-ratio can not become 
arbitrarily small. δE is the minimum real consumption level, which is determined by the 
social background. 
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The employment in the market segment can  be calculated as: 
 
  L l K P P P 22 2 = ,  
 























The disequilibrium in the planned segment is expressed through: 
 
  E wL P C P P M P = − 22  
 
As long as the planned segment plays a dominant role in the economy, we assume, that the 
deficit of supply for consumption is positive. Because the production structure of the capital 
stock in the planned segment does not respond to the market situation immediately, it would 
be a coincidence for the E to equal zero. However, the resource allocation in the market 
segment will react to this disequilibrium and keep the whole economy in equilibrium.  
 
Since the planned prices are the foundation of the planning calculation, abolishing the price 
control is likely giving up the planning. Without the planned price as the basis of the 
evaluation of the target, it is impossible to control and to judge, whether the plan is carried 
out well or not. The practicability of the plan is now very questionable. The planned segment 
is no longer a subsystem, that could function independently. This dependence of the planned 
segment on the market changes the role of the planning in the economy qualitatively.  
 
The direct effect of abandoning price control is, that the difference in the growth rates will be 
reduced, as the price advantage of the market segment diminishes. The planned segment gets 
more vitality and can grow faster than before. Without price control, the enterprises in the 
planned segment operate under more market-like environment and gain more and more 
market-specific features. The intrinsic transition is taking place. The most far reaching 
influence of this policy is the dissolution of the planning mechanism. Because a strict control 
of the execution of the plan depends strongly on the information about the prices, this price 
reform policy made the control impossible. 
 
The impact of freeing up of the prices on the whole economy is tremendous. However, this 
policy may result in different effect at different times during the transition. At a certain stage 
of the transition, this policy may promote the development of the market segment, in another 
stage of the transition, it may even block the transition process. The correct timing is crucial 










3.7 Advantages in the Market Segment   
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In an economy with two subsystems  organised by different principles, the vitality 
of a subsystem could be judged on the rate of growth of that subsystem. Generally, the ratio 




















In this formula the advantage in the market segment in regard to the rate of growth of the 
capital stock can be traced back to three advantages in the market segment. The first one is 
the  price advantage. Producers from the market segment can take advantage of the shortage 
situation and always sell their products at a higher price. It holds that PP M P > . The second 
one is wage advantage. Owing to the large labour reserve in agriculture, the industrial 
enterprises of the market segment are facing an almost unlimited labour supply, especially at 
the beginning of the transition, when the demand for labour is relatively small. Therefore, 
they can  hire the labour at lower wage rate ww M P < . The last one is the advantage of more 
efficient production. In the previous discussion, we have always assumed, that the production 
technologies are the same in both segments. There are some good reasons, why the 
production in the market segment is more efficient than that in the planned segment. The most 
important one is the selectivity of  the investment: The enterprises of the market segment do 
not need to cover every branch of the economy. They produce only in the most profitable 
branches through selective investment, while the enterprises of planned economy have to 
cover all the branches, where some production will be unprofitable. Consequently, with the 
same amount of resources, more goods and service can be produced in the market segment 
than in the planned segment. Better management is another important reason for more 
efficient production in the market segment. 
 
These three aspects can also be put in another way: the difference in the growth rates between 
the two segments consists of the difference in the price, the difference in the production 
technologies, which is expressed through the function gP and gM, and the difference in the 
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      with:  g l f l f l l () : () () = − ′  
 
If the production technology is the same in both segments, the difference resulting from the 
labour intensity can be illustrated in the following graph: 
                     
42 We neglect the depreciation in the following discussion to simplify the discussion, because 
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Graph 3.4 Production and labour intensity with same technology 
 
The curve is the production function f(l). From the cost minimising behaviour of the 
producers we have: f´(l)=w/P. Owing to the fact, that the wage rate in the market segment is 
lower than that in the planned segment, the labour intensity in the market segment must be 
higher than that in the planned segment. Graphically the slope at lP must be steeper than that 
at lM. Therefore, lP is smaller than lM, because this slope is decreasing. The intercept can be 
expressed as: f-f´l, which is equal to g(l) by definition. The difference between the intercepts 
A-B expresses the difference in growth of the capital stock due to the difference in labour 
intensity (see Graph 3.4 ).  
 
If the production in the market segment is more efficient, this difference will be even bigger. 
It is expressed through A-C, that is the sum of the difference due to the labour intensity A-B 
and that due to the production function itself B-C.  
 
f lw P P P P ′ = () /  
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Graph 3.5 Production and labour Intensity with different technologies 
 
During the process of the transition, the productive capacity of the market segment will grow 
and the behaviour in the planned segment will change. Thus the relative advantages of  the 
market segment become increasingly weaker over time. It all depends on whether the planned 
segment has the same performance as the market segment.  
 
 
5.8 Industrialisation and Labour Distribution 
 
All the previous discussion was conducted under the assumption of labour surplus. The urban 
minimum wage exceeds the competitive level and draws rural labour into the industrial 
sector. The industrial sector faces an „unlimited supply of labour“ and the minimum wage can 
prevail. Labourers are engaged in three groups of employment: industrial production of the 
planned segment, industrial production of the market segment, and agricultural production. 
During the transition from plan to market, the industrialisation process is going on. The 
labour movement from the agricultural sector into the industrial sector proceeds continuously. 
Consequently, the agricultural wage rate will rise and approach the industrial wage rate. The 
living standard in the rural areas will improve with the raising labour income in agriculture. 
As soon as the wage rate in the agricultural sector reaches the level in the industrial sector, a 
qualitative change in the labour market will take place. There will be no more labour surplus. 
The unified real wage rate will not be fix on the minimum level but will be determined 
endogenously on the competitive level.  
 
In the equation (7me), this ratio can be determined. The question of the existence of the 
solution is, whether or not a positive rM exits, that can meet the equation (7me). To answer 
this question, we first show that the left hand side of (7me) is an increasing function of the 
rental wage ratio r w M M / . We denote the left side of (7me) by G r w M M (/ ) . 
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As the growth of capital stock is much faster than the growth of labour (we have assumed a 
constant labour supply), the overall labour intensity decreases with time and so does the 
rental-wage ratio. From the equation (5me) we know, that the price of industrial products will 
also decrease. This process will go on until the market price falls below the planned price. At 
least from this point on, the planned segment will be forced to follow the market price, 
otherwise no one would buy the products at the planned price. In this case, the planned 
segment obviously could not survive in the system, if it would not adjust itself to the market 
situation. 
 
The consideration above suggests the conclusion, that the industrialisation might be crucial to 
the transition from plan to market. As soon as the industrialisation is completed, the thorough 
removal of the planned segment will be inevitable, with only one exception that the planned 
segment behaves just like the market segment. 
 
The degree of industrialisation can be expressed through the share of industrial product in the 
whole economy. We have constructed the growth process in our model through the 
accumulation of capital stock. The whole production will grow with time. The 
industrialisation becomes a straight forward result of the assumption concerning the dualistic 
structure of the economy. 
 
 
3.9 Welfare effect of transition 
 
The consumption possibility expressed through real income is taken here as the indicator of 
welfare. It is well known that welfare concept is much more comprehensive than just a single 
object of real income43. Constrained by the model structure, the welfare effect will be only 
examined in this partial aspect. The participants of the economy during the transition process 
can be roughly divided into 4 groups: farmers, who are engaged in the agricultural 
production, farmer-workers, who were farmers and became industrial workers during the 
industrialisation process, workers of the state-owned enterprises, and capitalists, who own the 
capital stocks. The impact of the transition from plan to market on the welfare is different 
among the four groups, because they are engaged differently in the economy.  
 
At the early stage of the economic reform, farmers had benefited from the rural reform 
through rising price of agricultural products and freeing up of the market for agricultural 
products and side line products.  During the transition process accompanied by the 
industrialisation process, labourers moved continuously from agricultural sector into 
industrial sector. The marginal productivity increased in agriculture, thus, farmers' income 
rose continuously. Although farmers' income was the lowest among the four groups, farmers 
                     
43 Sen, Amartya (1988): in Hand Book of Development Economics Vol. 1, P.12 ff.   
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were facing improving living standards.  Hence, they are happy with of the reform 
policies, as long as the improvement continues. 
 
Farmer-workers improved their living standard through moving into the industrial 
employment. They earn more than their former colleagues, who remained in the countryside. 
In this sense, they are grateful to the reform policy. However, they have to lead a rather hard 
live in the urban area. Owing to the excess supply of labour, their real income will be fix on 
the minimum level. They faced the fact, that although they earned more and they had to spend 
more for living. Hence, their opinion to the reform is twofold. On the one hand, they are 
grateful to the reform policy, that got the chance to work in industry and could improve their 
living standards in comparison to the situation before the reform. On the other hand, they will 
always complain about that the reform can not give them further improvement of living 
standard. 
 
Workers of the state-owned enterprises can not profit directly from the transition process, 
because their wage rate was determined through the planning. They might suffer from a loss 
of welfare due to the rising prices, which is caused by the higher prices in the market 
segment. However, with the progress of reform in the state-owned enterprises, the enterprises 
have gained comprehensive autonomy. The managers of the enterprises raised the income of 
the workers through rising the share of premium in the total wage.  From 1987 to 1993 the 
share of tariff wage fell from 85.8% to 50%. According to this fact, the central planning did 
not play the decisive role any more in the wage determination. It raises naturally the question, 
how is the wage rate determined in the state-owned enterprises during the economic reform. 
Neither the theory of marginal productivity nor the efficiency wage model can provide a 
sufficient explanation to the phenomena, because statistics show that the increase of wage rate 
in the state-owned enterprises is larger than the increase of productivity.  Obviously, the 
managers of the state-owned enterprises have taken the growth of real income of the workers 
of their enterprises into their object function44. These wage increases in the state-owned 
enterprises are partly responsible for the fall of profit rate in the state-owned enterprises 
during the transition process. Due to the increased real wage, workers of the state-owned 
enterprises experienced welfare gain during the transition. However, it is questionable 
whether the improvement can last throughout the transition process. The profit fall will 
threaten the existence of the state-owned enterprises and thus the existence of the workers. 
Without significant technical progress, the improvement of the living standard of the workers 
of the state-owned enterprises can not continue during the transition process. 
 
The capitalists have profited the most through the transition process. At the early stage of the 
reform the capital rental rate was very high. With the expansion of the market segment and 
the capital stocks, the rental rate will go down. A new entrepreneur class is slowly forming 
during the transition process. This class is naturally the support of reform policy. The role of 
small savers, who just put their money in the bank, is total different from the capitalists, who 
invest money direct in the production process. Due to the monopoly position of the bank, the 
interest rate is always set at the level not higher than the inflation rate, such that small savers 
can get no profit from their capital - savings.   
 
Summing up, the 4 groups can all profit from the economic reform. Farmers, who earn at least 
among the four groups, can get improvement of living standard, as long as the 
industrialisation process continues. Farmer-workers, whose income is between farmers and 
                     
44 Wing Thye Woo has argued for this behaviour in Wing Thye Woo (1994), P. 286.   
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the other, improve their living standard  through moving from the agricultural into 
industrial sector. A further improvement will not be possible, before farmers' income reach 
the level of the farmer-workers. From then on their real wage will rise continuously. Workers 
of the state-owned enterprises, who earn the most among the working class, get real wage 
increases, because the managers of the enterprises act partly as agency of the workers. 
However, these increases of real wage are not economically founded.  They can only last in 
the long run, if the technical progress in the state-owned enterprises can guarantee enough 




3.10 Timing of the Reform 
 
The evolution path of the model, as a series of the temporal equilibrium in the system, 
depends on the initial condition and the functioning mechanism in each period respectively. 
Any reform policy, that is designed to change the functioning in the planned segment can 
affect the state of the temporal equilibrium in each period, and thus the process of the 
transition from plan to market. It is worthy to discuss, whether a certain policy aimed at 
accelerating the transition from plan to market can really have this expected effect. It is 
crucial, whether the ratio of the production capacity of the market segment to that of the 
planned segment has reached a certain level at the time, when the policy is carried out. 
Because the ratio of production capacity between the two segments alters with time, the 
timing of a reform policy may be crucial, whether the policy can have the intended effect. 
 
We know from the discussion in chapter 4, whether the overall economic situation in the 
system has still CPE-specific features depends on, whether the market segment can correct 
the disequilibrium situation produced by the planned segment. The critical point is whether 
the equilibrium rental rate in the market segment is larger that the rate of disequilibrium 











* < , the disequilibrium situation persists and there exists forced saving. If forced 
savings are used for investment in the planned segment, the transition may be stopped. 
Recalling the conclusion of the discussion about the dual price in the state-owned enterprises 
(see section 5.6.2), we know the equilibrium rental rate becomes smaller than without the dual 
price policy. If this policy was introduced at an early stage of the reform, when the market 
production capacity was still very small, the market rental rate might possibly become smaller 
than the disequilibrium rate. This might lead to disequilibrium in the whole economy. Even 
worse, it might cease the transition process, if the growth of planned segment supported by 
the forced saving might be faster than that in the market segment. Thus a policy, which is 
designed to accelerate the transition process, may result in opposite effect. Similar conclusion 
holds also for the policy of freeing up of the price control. However, when the production 
capacity in the market segment is so far expanded, that the disequilibrium rate is far smaller 
than the market rental rate, the price reform can have its intended effect - enforcing the 
transition process. 
 
From the above example, we can conclude, that in the evaluation of a reform policy, we must 
always consider the interaction of planned segment and market segment, even if the policy 
may be only designed for the planned segment. The correct timing plays an important role in 




3.11 Feasible Transition Path 
 
From the previous discussion we have seen that, whether the transition from plan to market 
can proceed successfully, depends on the constellation of the planned segment and the market 
segment, on the one hand, and the policy intervention, on the other. The evolution process 
driven by the laisser-faire market force may not always lead to a successful transition from 
plan to market (section 4.5). Besides the production technology and the practice in the 
planned segment, the ratio of the initial production capacity in the market segment to that in 
the planned segment is crucial for the transition process. To promote the transition, the policy 
makers are asked to create a sound initial condition for the transition through political 
measures. The reform policy aimed at transforming the planned segment into market segment, 
such as price reform and wage and labour market reform, will not always lead to acceleration 
of the transition process. Under certain circumstances, it will obstacle the transition process, if 
these policies were not carried out with an appropriate timing. However, numerous political 
options exist, which will lead to a successful end of the transition.  
 
Although the evolution path depends on the initial condition and the political intervention and 
is hence not unique, the development of the economic system will go through several similar 
stages along each feasible successful transition path. 
 
At the early stage, when the market segment comes into existence, the capital stock of the 
market segment is rather small. Its production is restricted at first to the consumption sector, 
the unsatisfied demand for consumer goods provides a ready market for the products.  The 
production of consumer goods is technically less complicated than the production for 
investment goods, so that the new producers can get an easy start in the consumer sector. 
Moreover, the production of consumer products is desired by the reform policy makers, who 
are anxious to improve the supply situation in the consumption market.  
 
Through the appearance of the market segment in the economy, the supply situation will be 
improved. More of the labour force is employed in the industrial production. The whole 
economy grows faster and becomes more flexible in production and resource allocation. 
Owing to the insufficient production capacity in the market segment, not all the deficit in 
supply of consumer goods can be covered. The unsatisfied consumer demand becomes forced 
saving. The planned segment is still dominant in the economy. The main features of the CPE 
in the economy, such as shortage of supply, fixed prices and rigid factor allocation, are only 
quantitatively reduced. However, the large difference between the demand and the supply due 
to the insufficient production capacity drives the market price to its highest level. The price 
advantage of the market segment is at its greatest. Hence, the market segment grows the 
fastest at this stage. In general the market segment plays a complimentary role in the 
economy. We call this stage the complimentary stage. 
 
The second stage begins, when the production of the market segment expands into the 
investment sector. During the first stage a certain production capacity was established in the 
market segment. It can cover all the supply deficit of the planned segment. Moreover, the 
enterprises of market segment are also involved in the production of investment goods. The 
market segment becomes more and more of an independent economic sub-system. While 
during the first stage the market segment has to rely on the investment products from the 
planned segment, it can now at least in part cover the demand for investment production 
through its own production.  
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During this stage, the growth rate in the  market segment is larger than that in the 
planned segment. The price advantage, the wage advantage and the production advantage 
support faster growth in the market segment. Of course, with the expansion of the market 
segment the price advantage will be reduced stepwise. But, the price advantage continues to 
be significant at this stage. The overall economic situation is much more market-like. The 
features of CPE exist only within the planned segment and are not significant for the whole 
economy anymore. In this stage, both the planned segment and the market segment show 
development. The transition is taking place. We call this stage the development stage. 
 
 
Facing faster growth in the market segment and shrinking share of the planned segment in the 
economy, the policy makers are motivated to carry out reform to adjust the planned segment 
to the new economic situation. We have discussed the various reform policies in the previous 
sections. All the policies are aimed at accelerating the growth in the planned segment through 
making it more market-like. These adjustments imply the reduction of planning step by step 
and even abandoning planning completely. These adjustments can lower the price advantage, 
the production advantage and the wage advantage of the market segment. However, these 
advantages will only be completely neutralised, if all the planning decisions in the planned 
segment will coincide with that in the market segment. This implies, however, that the 
planned segment would become itself a market segment. The policy making in this stage of 
the transition concentrates on the adjustment of the planned segment to catch up the 
advantage of the market segment. We call this stage, the voluntary adjustment stage 
 
Parallel to the transition process, the industrialisation process is going on. The labour 
movement takes place continuously. With the increasing productivity in agriculture, the wage 
difference between industry and agriculture is getting smaller. The labour surplus reduces 
with time. The fourth stage begins, when the labour surplus disappears. In the further 
development, the real wage in the market segment will rise. As soon as the real wage in the 
market segment reaches that in the planned segment, the competition from the market 
segment will really threaten the existence of the planned segment. The planned segment can 
only survive in the system, if it performs just the same as the market segment. This implies, 
that the planned segment has to become itself a market segment, otherwise it will not survive 





Complicated economic phenomena during the transition from plan to market can be classified 
into intrinsic and extrinsic transition according to the cause of the transition phenomena. The 
global behaviour of an economy in the transition process depends on, which kind of transition 
plays the dominant role during the transition process. While the intrinsic transition touched 
off generally by some reform polices is always accompanied by „shocks“ and thus produces 
disturbances in the economy, the extrinsic transition driven by the growth of the market 
activities is a more smooth process. The approach of this classification makes it possible to 
model the complex transition process with conventional methods of neo-classic theory. The 
extrinsic transition can be well captured in the framework of a growth theory.  The intrinsic 
transition can be modelled as the impact of the political instrument on the planned economic 
activities and so on the whole economy. This twofold modelling of the transition process 
works well, if the extrinsic transition plays the governing role in the transition process. 
 
 
The transition from plan to market in China characterised by „growing out of plan“ is 
typically dominated by the extrinsic transition, where the growth, especially the faster growth 
of the market segment, is the most important driving force of the transition. This particular 
Chinese way of transition is marked by a decentralised industrialisation process during the 
reform era.  
 
Before the economic reform, Chinese industrialisation followed the Soviet-type way. In this 
mode of industrialisation, the central planning controlled the whole economic activities. 
Because the agriculture should provide „surplus“ for the industrialisation, the price of 
agricultural product was kept at a very low level. Since consumption should give way for the 
„productive accumulation“, the wage rate in industry was also controlled at very low level. 
(Because the price for agricultural product determined the income of farmers, the planning 
authority was able to controlled the income of farmers through controlling the price.) 
Consequently, although the economy had grown at a rather high level, the living standard was 
rarely improved. The economic reform led by the rural reform has changed significantly the 
mechanism of the industrialisation. It freed the economic force from the bureaucratic 
administration. The improved income on the rural area, the existing technological condition, 
the liberalised economic environment and the established incentive stimulated and enforced a 
decentralised industrialisation process. A market economic segment emerged during this 
process. The market segment took advantage of the existing planned segment and could get a 




The faster growth of the market segment can be traced back to three economic reasons rooted 
in the existing Chinese economic condition and history. 1. The huge reservoir of the labour 
force in China, i.e. the existing labour surplus, made is possible to use labour at a lower wage 
rate in the market segment than in the planned segment. Taking advantage of the lower price 
in planned segment, the market segment can even work with marginal labour productivity 
lower than minimum consumption level. This advantage in the labour using will prevail, as 
long as the industrialisation process still goes on and the wage difference between rural area 
and urban area exists significantly. In this context, the industrialisation process plays a key 
role during the transition from plan to market. 2. Owing to the price mechanism of the market, 
producers in the market segment can always sell its product at a higher(or not lower to be 
precisely) price level than those in the planned segment, in which the price was set by the  
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planning authority. The price difference was legitimated  by  the  reform  policy  of  „two 
tiers“-system, that was historically founded by Chinese economic development. The different 
wages and the different prices lead to that the capital income in the marker segment is much 
higher than that in  the planned segment. This leads to, in turn, that the production capacity 
will growth much faster in the market than in the planned segment. However, the price 
advantage will disappear, as soon as the price reform in the planned segment is completed. 
The wage advantage will exist, until the industrialisation process is finished. 3. The flexible 
allocation of the market is another reason, why the market segment can grow faster. The 
investors of the market segment can choose activities selectively in the most profitable 
branches, while the planned segment has to provide some products and services, which are 
not profitable and hence no investors of the market segment are ready to produce. At this 
point, we touch the field of market failure and public economy, whose dimension reaches far 
beyond the scope of this manuscript. However, we know, in this context, that the value of the 
planned segment can not be judged only by the growth. 
 
The intrinsic transition in China can be viewed as the adjustment process of the planned 
segment to the continuously changing economic situation, driven by the market force. The 
price reform could reduce the price disadvantage of the planned segment against the market 
segment and accelerate the growth in the planned segment. The reform on the labour market 
would reduce the disadvantage in the labour using in the long run. However, with these 
reform policies, the planned segment loses his planned economic nature. The disadvantages 
can only be totally removed, if the planned segment can performance identically as the market 
segment, which implies that the planned segment would become itself a market segment.  
 
 
We have concluded that the reform of the financial market is key to the transition process. If 
the financial market is still administratively controlled and a „favour-planned-segment“ 
policy is pursued, the transition process will be ended at a certain constant mixture with 
planned segment on the one side and the market segment on the other. The planned economic 
activities may dominate in this situation. If the financial market is run somehow 
competitively, then the market segment will dominate in the long run. The price reform and 
the reform of the labour market influence only the short run economic situation, and hence are 
important for contemporary economic policy. They have no significance in the long run. 
 
 
The impact of the transition on common welfare expressed by consumption is in general 
positive owing to the over all growth process. However, the average gain in the welfare 
should be viewed differentially. The owners of the capital stocks profit the most from the 
transition process through high capital income. The farmer-workers moved from agriculture 
into industry get more real income owing to the higher wage rate in the industrial sector. The 
farmers gain more income through rising wage due to rising price of agriculture product. The 
workers in the state-owned enterprises could not benefit from the transition process. By 
contrast, they would have to suffer from the loss of real income due to the rising price. In this 
sense, the transition has a negative redistribution effect for the workers of the state-owned 
enterprises. But, this loss could be compensated, if the planned wage rate would be set to 
guarantee a constant level of real income. However, this guarantee is done on the cost of the 
capital income in the planned segment, which will weaken the growth of the planned segment. 
Hence, this guarantee can only be founded by a technical progress in the long run.  
 
Therefore, the transition will promise a golden future, only if the technical progress enforced 
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Summary of the Model 
 
In summary the whole model consists of 31 variables with 26 independent equations and 5 
exogenous variables. The following is a list of the variables: 
 
List of variables 
 
1  P P 2   the planned price for industrial goods  Exogenous 
2  wP  the planned wage rate  Exogenous 
3  K P 2   the capital stock in the industrial sector of the planned 
segment 
Exogenous 
4  L P 2   the employed labour in the industrial sector of the planned 
segment 
Endogenous 
5  I P 2   the amount of the produced investment goods  Endogenous 
6  C P 2   the amount of the produced consumer goods  Endogenous 
7  Y P 2   the amount of the industrial products  Endogenous 
8  rP  the rental rate in the planned economic segment  Endogenous 
9  NCP
d  the demand for consumption from the planned segment  Endogenous 
10  NI P
d  the demand for investment from the planned segment  Endogenous 
11  E  the shortage of supply for consumer goods in planned 
segment 
Endogenous 
12  K M 1 :  the capital stock in the agricultural sector  Endogenous 
13  K M 2   the capital stock in the industrial sector of the market 
segment 
Endogenous 
14  P M 1   the market price for the agricultural goods  Endogenous 
15  P M 2   the market price for the industrial goods  Endogenous 
16  L M 1   the labour employed in the agricultural sector  Endogenous 
17  L M 2   the labour employed in the industrial sector of the market 
segment 
Endogenous 
18  LM  the total labour employed in the market segment  Endogenous 
19  Y M 1   the amount of agricultural goods produced in the market 
segment  
Endogenous 
20  Y M 2   the amount of industrial goods produced in the market 
segment 
Endogenous 
21  r M 1   the rental rate of capital in the agricultural sector  Endogenous 
22  r M 2   the rental rate of capital in the industrial sector  Endogenous 
23  KM  the total capital stock in the market segment  Exogenous 
24  w M 2   the market wage rate in the industrial sector  Endogenous 
25  w M 1   the market wage rate in the agricultural sector  Endogenous 
26  I M 2   the produced investment goods in the market segment  Endogenous 
27  C M 2   the produced consumer goods in the market segment  Endogenous 
28  Y
d
1   the demand for the agricultural products  Endogenous 
29  NCM
d   the nominal demand for consumption from the market 
segment 
Endogenous 
30  NI M
d   the nominal demand for investment from the market 
segment 
Endogenous 




Summary of equations: 
 
1) Equations for the planned segment: 
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  EN C P C P
d
P P =− 22         ( 8 p )  
 
2) Equations for the market segment: 
 
  YF K L iM
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iM iM = (,)         ( 1 m - 2 m )  
 
  Y I C M M M 222 =+        ( 3 m )  
 


























=          ( 7 m - 8 m )  
 
  LLL M M M =+ 12         ( 9 m )  
 
  L L L M P G += 2          ( 1 0 m )  
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  wv w M E P 2 =          ( 1 2 m )  
 
  wPP M E P M 22 2 1 =+ − δ λ λ (( ) ) .        ( 1 3 m )  
 
  YL M
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  NC w L w L s r K M
d
M M M M r M M =++ − 11 22 1 ()      ( 1 5 m )  
 
  NI s r K M
d
r M M =        ( 1 6 m )  
 
  YY M
d
M 11 =          ( 1 7 m )  
 




P P 22 2 2 = + −      ( 1 8 m )  
 




P P M M 22 2 2 1 1 =+ − −      ( 1 9 m )  
 
 
3) Equations for the dynamic properties of the system: 
 
  Kt Kt It Kt P P P
P
P 22 2 11 () ( ) () ( ) = −+ − − δ      (A) 
 
   ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( − − + − = t K t I t K t K M
m
M M M δ     (B) 
 
  It It M
m
P
p ( ), ( ):  real investment in the market segment and planned   
   s e g m e n t .   
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Appendix 3  
 
Proof of Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium and the Dynamic of the System 
 
A3.1 Restatement of the Model 
 
The model constructed in the section2 consists of two segments. In solving for equilibrium we only 
have to consider the market segment, because the variables in the planned segment are determined 
through planning decision and hence can be treated as independently from the market.  Owing to 
the constant returns to scale technology, we can restate the sub-model of the market segment in 

























=       the share of the capital in i-th sector in the market segment 
 
With the newly defined variables, the production function can be restated in terms of labour 
intensity as follows: 
 




iM iM iM iM i iM i i (, ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) = = = 11     
 
The differential of the above equation is: 
 
  FK f l Kf l L
i
iM i i iM i i iM =′ = ′ () / ()        
 
For the linear homogenous production function, the Eule-Theorem holds (for convenience we have 
omitted the subscript):  
 
  FF KF L K L =+
′′      or   f l F lf l K () () = + ′     
 
Dividing both sides by f´ and using the relation  f FL ′=  and F f F F r w K K L ′= = , we get the 
following relations, respectively, for agricultural production: 
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The equation for market balance on the agriculture market (17m) can be written as follows: 
 
  u f L Kl G M G 11 == ε ε /         ( 3 m a )  
 















u1 is the share of the capital stock used in the agricultural  sector. u2 is the share of the capital 
stock used in the industrial sector. The shares in both sectors add up to one. 
 
  uu 12 1 +=   .          ( 4 m a )  
 
Using  EN I P I P
d
P P =− − () 22 and  I Y K f u K f M M M M 21 21 2 2 1 2 2 = = = η η η , we can rewrite the 
market balance for investment product (18m) as follows (here we assume sr =1) :  
 
  η1 222 u f P r e M M = −         ( 5 m a )  
 













η1 is the share of the investment products in the whole industrial production. η2 is the share of the 
consumption products in the whole industrial production. For the shares of production of 
investment goods and consumption goods, the following equation holds: 
 
  η η 12 1 +=         ( 6 m a )  
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We can put the full employment condition as follows: 
 
  lu lu l L K M M M 11 22 + = = / .        ( 9 m a )  
 
The minimum-wage condition (13m) can be restated with the new variables: 
 













2 () ( ) −= −
δδ
      ( 1 0 m a )  
 
For the nominal wage we restate just the equation (12m): 
 
  ww M E P 2 = ν          ( 1 1 m a )  
 
In this restated system there are 11 independent equations and 11 endogenous variables: 
lluu P P w w M M M M 12 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 ,,, ,, , , , , δ δ  and rM. Obviously, the solution for this restated system is 
the equilibrium solution of the original system. In next section, we will give an answer to the 
question, whether there exists a solution for this restated system.  
 
A3.2 Existence and Uniqueness  
 
The existence of a solution for the system is demonstrated in the following way. First we show, that 
all the endogenous variables except rM and w M 2  can be uniquely expressed as functions of the 
rental wage ratio r w M M 2  through the equations from (1ma) to (9ma). In the equation (10ma) an 
equilibrium rental wage ratio can be uniquely determined.  
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It is easy to show, that in equations (1ma) and  (2ma) a monotone relation prevails between  l1 
and  r w M M 1 ,  l2 and r w M M 2 , respectively, if we take derivatives of both sides of the two 
equations with respect to r w M M 1  and r w M M 2  separately: 
 














































































Therefore, for a given ratio of rental rate to wage rate, the labour intensity will be uniquely 
determined. Moreover, the prices can also be determined, because they are functions of the labour 
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From the equation of full employment we can get: 
 
  l u l l lM 21 1 2 +− = () 
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Therefore, we can view ω1 as a function of ω2. Because ω2 is a function of rM ,  ω1 is also a 
function of rM, noting that w M 2  is determined independently from rM in (11ma). All the variables 
lluu P P w M M M 12 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ,,, ,, , , , δ δ  can be uniquely determined, if rM is given.  
 





















.    (10m-b) 
The right side of (10m-b) is a constant, while the left hand side is a function of rM. We denote the 
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We begin by picking out the first part of the derivation and insert the equation (12ma) into it. Using 
the relation  f Pw l r M M M 22 2 2 =+ ,  du du 12 = −  and dw d r M M ω22 =  we get: 
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  D r u M () ′= > 2 0 
and 
 




























As the first and second derivatives of D rM ()  are  all positive,  D rM ()  will rise with rising rM  




→+∞ =+ ∞. As rM  decreases to a certain point, it holds then  f E 2′= δ , or D rM () =0. 
Because D rM ()  is a continuous monotone increasing function, there must be a unique positive rM
*  
for which the equation (8ma) holds. That is to say, that there exists a unique equilibrium solution. 
 
We can illustrate the equilibrium solution graphically in Graph a3.1. D rM ()  is a rising function of 
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Graph a3.1 Existence of the Equilibrium 
 
 
A3.3 Stability of the Equilibrium 
  
To examine the stability of the equilibrium we have to consider the reaction of the system to a 
disturbance away from equilibrium. We adopt the idea of Walrasian tâtonnemont process. We 
specify the reactions of the prices to excess demand on the agricultural market and the industrial 
market, respectively. 
The excess demand for agricultural products is the difference between the demand and the supply 
of these products. 
 
  E L Y M G M 11 = − ε  
 
The total demand for industrial products is the total income minus the expenditure for agricultural 
products. It can be expressed as follows: 
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The real demand for industrial products in the market segment can be written as the residual 
demand, because the price of the planned segment is lower than that in the market segment. Hence, 
the real demand must satisfy the following condition: 
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The excess demand can therefore be written as the difference between the real demand and the 
supply: 
 
  EY Y M M
d
M 22 2 = −  
 
We rewrite the excess demand in relation to capital stock of the market segment as follows. 
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22 = ()  with  h and h 22 00 0 () = ′> . 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume hh 12 00 1 ′ = ′ = () () . In the neighbourhood of an equilibrium 
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To check the stability, we calculate at first  the  four partial derivatives for the labour 
intensities. Rewriting  equation (1ma) we get: 
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To calculate the partial derivatives with respect to P M 1 , we take P M 2  as constant. Considering 
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Now we calculate the partial derivatives for the stability condition. Because the production 
function has a decreasing marginal productivity,  f f l l l 11 1 1 2 − ′ − () ( )  are always positive. We get:  
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We use the relation: lll m 12 >> ,  because  the  agricultural production is more labour 
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Appendix 4 Tables 
 
Table 1.1 Agricultural Production 
 
Year  Index of Value 
Added45 





1952 100  100,00 57482 1,00 
1953 101,9  101,90 58796 1,00 
1954 101,7  103,63 60266 0,99 
1955 107,9  111,82 61465 1,05 
1956 104,7  117,07 62828 1,07 
1957 103,1  120,70 64653 1,07 
1958 100,4  121,19 65994 1,06 
1959 84,1  101,92 67207 0,87 
1960 83,6  85,20 66207 0,74 
1961 101,4  86,40 65859 0,75 
1962 104,5  90,28 67295 0,77 
1963 111,3  100,49 69172 0,84 
1964 112,9  113,45 70499 0,93 
1965 109,7  124,45 72538 0,99 
1966 107,2  133,41 74542 1,03 
1967 101,9  135,95 76368 1,02 
1968 98,4  133,77 78534 0,98 
1969 100,8  134,84 80671 0,96 
1970 107,7  145,23 82992 1,01 
1971 101,9  147,99 85229 1,00 
1972 99,1  146,65 87177 0,97 
1973 109,0  159,85 89211 1,03 
1974 104,1  166,41 90859 1,05 
1975 102,0  169,74 92420 1,06 
1976 98,2  166,68 93717 1,02 
1977 97,8  163,01 94974 0,99 
1978 104,1  169,70 96259 1,01 
1979 106,1  180,05 97542 1,06 
1980 98,5  177,35 98705 1,03 
1981 107,0  189,76 100072 1,09 
1982 111,5  211,58 101590 1,20 
1983 108,3  229,15 102764 1,28 
1984 112,9  258,71 103876 1,43 
1985 101,8  263,36 105851 1,43 
                     
45 This Index is calculated based on comparable prices with 
preceding year=100. 
46 This Index is calculated based on comparable prices the 
value in 1952 as 100.  
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1986 103,3  272,05 107507 1,45 
1987 104,7  284,84 109300 1,50 
1988 102,5  291,96 111026 1,51 
1989 103,1  301,01 112704 1,54 
1990 107,3  322,99 114333 1,62 
1991 102,4  330,74 115823 1,64 
1992 104,7  346,28 117171 1,70 
1993 104,7  362,56 118517 1,76 
1994 104,0  377,06 119850 1,81 
1995 105,0  395,91 121121 1,88 
1996 105,1  416,10 122389 1,95 
1997 103,5  430,67 123626 2,00 
1998 103,5  445,74 124761 2,05 
1999 102,8  458,22 125786 2,09 
2000 102,4  469,22 126743 2,13 
2001 102,8  482,36 127627 2,17 
 
Source:  Chinese Statistic Year Book 2002 p.53 p.93 
Chinese Statistic Year Book 1995 p.59 
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1980 2792,12  1922,6  543,96  179,97  47,14  98,45 
1983 4123,78  2750  826,49  320,88  82,63  143,78 
1984 5067,55 3214,13  1161,31  370,58  132,55  188,98 
1985 6340,04 3619,49  1750,08  510,49  190,42  269,56 
1986 7554,23 4013,01  2380,79  591,93  245,4  323,1 
1987 9431,61  4675,7  3284,86  723,31  334,47  413,27 
1988 12534,69 5865,27  4781,16  895,33  434,44  558,49 
1989 14480,17 6534,73  5886,02  919,17  515,5  624,75 
1990 16619,21 7662,09  6719,13  978,47  579,62  679,3 
1991 19004,09 8057,03  8266,5  1142,32  660,76  777,48 
1992 25386,28 9084,71  12717,09  1570,01  906,04  1108,43 
 
Share of each Sectors 
Year Total  Agr.  Ind.  Constr. Transp  Trade 
1980 100  68,86  19,48  6,45  1,69  3,53 
1983 100  66,69  20,04  7,78  2,00  3,49 
1984 100  63,43  22,92  7,31  2,62  3,73 
1985 100  57,09  27,60  8,05  3,00  4,25 
1986 100  53,12  31,52  7,84  3,25  4,28 
1987 100  49,57  34,83  7,67  3,55  4,38 
1988 100  46,79  38,14  7,14  3,47  4,46 
1989 100  45,13  40,65  6,35  3,56  4,31 
1990 100  46,10  40,43  5,89  3,49  4,09 
1991 100  42,40  43,50  6,01  3,48  4,09 
1992 100  35,79  50,09  6,18  3,57  4,37 
 
Source: Chinese Statistic Year Book 1993, p.333  
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1978 3289  358  0,11 
1979 3673  423  0,12 
1980 3915  509  0,13 
1981 4037  579  0,14 
1982 4326  646  0,15 
1983 4739  757  0,16 
1984 5262  1245  0,24 
1985 6302  1827  0,29 
1986 6971  2413  0,35 
1987 8250  3243  0,39 
1988 10351 4529  0,44 
1989 12342 5244  0,42 
1990 13063 6050  0,46 
1991 14954 8780  0,59 
1992 17824 13635  0,76 
1993 22724 23446  1,03 
1994 26200 32336  1,23 
 
Source47: Chinese Statistic Year Book 1993 p.396 and p.412 
  Chinese Statistic Year Book 1995 p.365 and p.379 
                     
47 Although it is questionable, whether the sudden changes in the figures of 1984 and 1992 





Table 1.5 Growth rates in state-owned industry and in the agriculture (nominal)  
 







Growth rate of 
output in 
agriculture 




1978 3289  1379     
1979 3673  1698  0,23  0,12 
1980 3915  1923  0,13  0,07 
1981 4037  2181  0,13  0,03 
1982 4326  2486  0,14  0,07 
1983 4739  2750  0,11  0,10 
1984 5262  3214  0,17  0,11 
1985 6302  3620  0,13  0,20 
1986 6971  4013  0,11  0,11 
1987 8250  4676  0,17  0,18 
 





Table 1.6 Composition of investment 
 
year 1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
state allocated  269,7  279,2  339,71  421  407,8  440,6  475,5 
bank credit  122  176,1  175,5  258,4  510,27  638,3  835,9 
self financing  532,8  714,5  848,3  1082  1533,6  1808  2154, 
foreign investment  36,36  60,51  66,55  70,66  91,48  132,1  175,3 
total   961,0  1230  1430,0  1832,  2543,1  3019,  3640, 
 
Shares of the Investment 
 
state allocated   0,28  0,23  0,24  0,23  0,16  0,15  0,13 
bank credit  0,13  0,14  0,12  0,14  0,20  0,21  0,23 
self financing  0,55  0,58  0,59  0,59  0,60  0,60  0,59 
foreign invstment  0,04  0,05  0,05  0,04  0,04  0,04  0,05 
 
year  1988  1989 1990 1991  1992 1993 1994 
state  allocated  410  342 388 373  334 463 529 
bank  credit  927  716  871  1292  2152 2925 3703 
self  financing  2901  2356 2329 2879  4025 6218 8001 
foreign  investment  259  274 278 316  457 907 1768 
 
share of investment 
 
total   4497  4137  4449  5509  7855  12457  16370 
state  allocated  0,09  0,08 0,09 0,07  0,04 0,03 0,03 
bank  credit  0,21  0,17 0,20 0,23  0,27 0,23 0,22 
self  financing  0,65  0,57 0,52 0,52  0,51 0,49 0,49 
foreign  investment  0,06  0,07 0,06 0,06  0,06 0,07 0,10 
 
Source:  Chinese Statistic Year Book 1988 p.559 
  Chinese Statistic Year Book 1993 p.145 
  Chinese Statistic Year Book 1995 p.137 
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Table 1.6b Composition of investment 
 
 
   Grouped by Source of Funds    Grouped by Use of Funds 















1981  269,76  122,00 36,36 532,89 689,83  223,64 47,54
1982  279,26  176,12 60,51 714,51 871,12  291,41 67,87
1983  339,71  175,50 66,55 848,30 993,32  358,31 78,43
1984  421,00  258,47 70,66 1082,74 1217,58  509,23 106,06
1985  407,80  510,27 91,48 1533,64 1655,46  718,08 169,65
     
1986  455,62  658,46 137,31 1869,19 2059,66  851,95 208,99
1987  496,64  871,98 181,97 2241,11 2475,65  1038,78 277,26
1988  431,96  977,84 275,31 2968,69 3099,66  1305,37 348,77
1989  366,05  762,98 291,08 2990,28 2994,59  1115,81 300,00
1990  393,03  885,45 284,61 2954,41 3008,72  1165,54 342,74
     
1991  380,43  1314,73 318,89 3580,44 3647,68  1460,19 486,63
1992  347,46  2214,03 468,66 5049,95 5163,37  2125,14 791,58
1993  483,67  3071,99 954,28 8562,36 8201,21  3315,92 1555,18
1994  529,57  3997,64 1768,95 11530,96 10786,52  4328,26 1928,08
1995  621,05  4198,73 2295,89 13409,19 13173,33  4262,46 2583,48
     
1996  (629,72)  (4576,53) (2747,41) (15465,35) (15153,41)  (4940,79) (2879,83)
  625,88  4573,69 2746,60 15412,40 15109,29  4925,98 2878,28
1997  696,74  4782,55 2683,89 17096,49 15614,03  6044,84 3282,25
1998  1197,39  5542,89 2617,03 19359,61 17874,53  6528,53 4003,10
1999  1852,14  5725,93 2006,78 20169,80 18795,93  7053,04 4005,74
2000  2109,45  6727,27 1696,24 22577,14 20536,26  7785,62 4595,85
     
2001  2546,42  7239,79 1730,73 26470,04 22954,88  8833,79 5424,83
      
Percentage     
1981  28,1  12,7 3,8 55,4 71,8  23,3 4,9
1982  22,7  14,3 4,9 58,1 70,8  23,7 5,5
1983  23,8  12,3 4,7 59,2 69,5  25,1 5,4
1984  23,0  14,1 3,9 59,0 66,4  27,8 5,8
1985  16,0  20,1 3,6 60,3 65,1  28,2 6,7
     
1986  14,6  21,1 4,4 59,9 66,0  27,3 6,7
1987  13,1  23,0 4,8 59,1 65,3  27,4 7,3
1988  9,3  21,0 5,9 63,8 65,2  27,5 7,3 
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1989  8,3  17,3 6,6 67,8 67,9  25,3 6,8
1990  8,7  19,6 6,3 65,4 66,6  25,8 7,6
     
1991  6,8  23,5 5,7 64,0 65,2  26,1 8,7
1992  4,3  27,4 5,8 62,5 63,9  26,3 9,8
1993  3,7  23,5 7,3 65,5 62,7  25,4 11,9
1994  3,0  22,4 9,9 64,7 63,3  25,4 11,3
1995  3,0  20,5 11,2 65,3 65,8  21,3 12,9
     
1996  2,7  19,6 11,8 66,0 66,0  21,5 12,5
1997  2,8  18,9 10,6 67,7 62,6  24,2 13,2
1998  4,2  19,3 9,1 67,4 62,9  23,0 14,1
1999  6,2  19,2 6,7 67,8 63,0  23,6 13,4
2000  6,4  20,3 5,1 68,2 62,4  23,7 13,9
     
2001  6,7  19,1 4,6 69,6 61,7  23,7 14,6
Source Chinese Statistic Year Book 2002 p.  
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1978 790,7  2208,39     
1979 846,4  2474,96  0,07 0,12 
1980 907,1  2681,11  0,07 0,08 
1981 923,3  2771,02  0,02 0,03 
1982 972,2  3020,61  0,05 0,09 
1983 1032,8  3301,54  0,06 0,09 
1984 1152,8  3717,48  0,12 0,13 
1985 1334,1  4585,06  0,16 0,23 
1986 1341,4  5242,43  0,01 0,14 
1987 1514,1  6246,95  0,13 0,19 
1988 1774,9  7893,28  0,17 0,26 
1989  1773,14 9682,25 0,00  0,23 
1990  1503,14 10430,8 -0,15  0,08 
1991  1661,15 11887,9 0,11  0,14 
1992 1944,12  14804,29  0,17 0,25 
1993 2454,70  17278,22  0,26 0,16 
1994 2876,25  17601,06  0,17 0,018 
 
Source:   Chinese Statistic Year Book 1993 p.430 
  Chinese Statistic Year Book 1994 p.399 
       Chinese Statistic Year Book 1995 p.402 
 
Table 3.1 Index of real wage and the annual growth rate of national income 
    
Year  Growth rate of 
national income (%) 
Index of average 
real wage 
1952 14(1953)  100 
1957 4.5  127.9 
1962 -6.5  92.1 
1965 17  110.1 
1970 23  105.6 
1975 8.3  107.9 
1980 6.4  124.7 
1981 4.9  123.4 
1982 8.3  124.9 
1983 9.8  126.7 
1984 13.5  145.6 
 
Source: Chinese Statistic Year Book 1988 p.52 and p.190. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Planned price index for agricultural products 
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Source:   Chinese Statistic Year Book 1993 p.238  
    Chinese Statistic Year Book 1995 p.233 
 